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ABSTRACT 
As artificial intelligence (AI) has become more commonplace, the monitoring 
of human behavior by machines and software bots has created so-called machine 
evidence. This new type of evidence poses procedural challenges in criminal jus-
tice systems across the world due to the fact that they have traditionally been tai-
lored for human testimony. This article’s focus is on information proffered as 
evidence in criminal trials which has been generated by AI-driven systems that 
observe and evaluate the behavior of human users to predict future behavior in 
an attempt to enhance safety. 
A poignant example of this type of evidence stemming from data gener-
ated by a consumer product is automated driving, where driving assistants 
as safety features, observe and evaluate a driver’s ability to retake control of 
a vehicle where necessary. In Europe, for instance, new intelligent devices, 
including drowsiness detection and distraction warning systems, will 
become mandatory in new cars beginning in 2022. In the event that 
human-machine interactions cause harm (e.g., an accident involving an 
automated vehicle), there is likely to be a plethora of machine evidence, or 
data generated by AI-driven systems, potentially available for use in a crimi-
nal trial. 
It is not yet clear if and how this the data can be used as evidence in 
criminal fact-finding, and adversarial and inquisitorial systems approach 
this issue very differently. Adversarial proceedings have the advantage of 
partisan vetting, which gives both sides the opportunity to challenge 
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consumer products offered as witnesses. By contrast, inquisitorial systems 
have specific mechanisms in place to introduce expert evidence recorded out-
side the courtroom, including to establish facts, which will be necessary to 
thoroughly test AI. 
Using the German and the U.S. federal systems as examples, this Article 
highlights the challenges posed by machine evidence in criminal proceedings. 
The primary area of comparison is the maintenance of trust in fact-finding as 
the law evolves to accommodate the use of machine evidence. This comparative 
perspective illustrates the enigma of AI in the courtroom and foreshadows what 
will become inevitable problems in the not-too-distant future. The Article con-
cludes that, at present, criminal justice systems are not sufficiently equipped to 
deal with the novel and varied types of information generated by embedded AI 
in consumer products. It is suggested that we merge the adversarial system’s 
tools for bipartisan vetting of evidence with the inquisitorial system’s inclusion 
of out-of-court statements under specific conditions to establish adequate means 
of testing machine evidence.    
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197  
A. Legally Defining AI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200  
B. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201  
II. MACHINE EVIDENCE GENERATED BY AI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202  
A. Automated Driving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202  
B. Substantive Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205  
C. AI and the Evidentiary Cycle in Criminal Trials . . . . . . . . . 207  
1. From Silent Witnesses to Digital Analytical Tools . 208  
2. Digital Layers and Trustworthy Fact-Finding . . . . . 211  
a. The Black Box Problem and Expert Evidence . . . . . 211  
b. AI-Generated Machine Evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212  
c. Consumer Products Generating Machine Evidence 213  
d. Meeting the Evidentiary Challenge .
. 
. . . . . . . . . . . 214  
3. The Evidentiary Cycle and Consumer Products 
Assisting Law Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215  
III. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE OF AI IN THE COURTROOM . . . . . . . 218  
A. In Pursuit of the Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218  
B. AI in Adversarial and Inquisitive Courtrooms . . . . . . . . . . . 219  
1. Machine Evidence in Modern Day Courtrooms . . 219  
2. Testing Machine Evidence for Relevance and 
Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222  
3. Use of Written Reports to Introduce Machine 
Evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225  
a. Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225  
b. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
196 [Vol. 51 
4. Machine Evidence and the Need for 
Contextualization and Confrontation . . . . . . . . . . 232  
a. Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234  
b. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237  
5. Machine Evidence’s Need for Translation Through 
Expert Testimony. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239  
a. Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240  
b. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244  
6. New Mechanisms of Contextualization and 
Credibility Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247  
IV. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Automated systems capable of handling a particular task, like driving 
a car, are currently defined as narrow Artificial Intelligence (AI). This 
should be distinguished from general AI that possesses human-like cog-
nitive abilities and an experiential understanding of its environments, 
coupled with the ability to process larger quantities of information at 
much greater speeds than the human mind.1 This Article focuses on 
AI-driven systems that observe and evaluate the behavior of human 
users in order to predict future behavior, such as safety enhancing driv-
ing systems that react automatically and autonomously to the actions 
and reactions of human drivers, i.e. external information. The poten-
tial to use data generated by general AI technology in courtrooms poses 
novel challenges to both substantive criminal law and criminal proce-
dure.2 AI has the capacity to observe and assess humans’ fitness to con-
tribute to a wide range of cooperative actions. Will this result in 
another digital evidentiary gathering tool? Is such data sufficiently reli-
able to be used in criminal proceedings? Could such observations 
amount to a type of “machine testimony”3 in the event of an accident? 
To address these questions, one must first acknowledge that robots and 
software bots—i.e., standalone machines or programs that interact with  
1. For a detailed discussion on definitional problems around AI, see Matthew U. Scherer, 
Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 353, 358–69 (2016). 
2. See generally Mireille Hildebrandt, Ambient Intelligence, Criminal Liability and Democracy, 2 CRIM. 
L. & PHIL. 163 (2008) (discussing the impact of ambient intelligence on criminal law). 
3. Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 1979 (2017). 
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users of a consumer product—are different from forensic instruments 
like breathalyzers, DNA testing kits, or radar speed guns. While the lat-
ter were designed to measure specific input data and perform straight-
forward calculations or provide other (predictable) output, narrow AI 
embedded in consumer products has the ability to collect information 
from a wide variety of inputs, assess the information autonomously for 
patterns, and convey a message based on algorithms and machine 
learning that is neither guided by nor entirely comprehended by 
humans. They were also not designed for evidentiary purposes. Thus, 
this message may be difficult to categorize and analyze using traditional 
evidentiary rules. 
An analysis of the relevant law on this topic reveals that the fact-finding 
procedure, and particularly the assessment of evidentiary reliability, is a 
human-focused phenomenon with the goal of providing transparent and 
objective information to the trier of fact while also safeguarding a reliable 
and valid fact-finding process. Therefore, the use of narrow AI in forensic 
instruments already poses challenges to evidentiary law and the appraisal 
of fact today. For instance, digitized breathalyzers have shed light on 
issues surrounding these types of evidentiary assistants that contain inher-
ent black-box problems—an inability to adequately explain their inner 
workings.4 
For more details on digitized breathalyzers, see id. at 1972, 1979, 2015–16; Stacy Cowley
& Jessica Silver-Greenberg, These Machines Can Put You in Jail. Don’t Trust Them, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/03/business/drunk-driving-breathalyzer. 
html.  
If the data generated by AI during a collaborative act with a 
human is admissible in court, it could potentially be classified as a 
form of documentary evidence or even a type of witness testimony. 
Regardless, the underlying issue remains: how AI and the data it 
produces can be meaningfully evaluated for reliability and credibil-
ity, particularly when the data presented in court has been gener-
ated by technology that evaluates human behavior, not in an effort 
to produce tangible evidence, but rather to meet a specific commer-
cial need without taking into consideration issues surrounding 
criminal justice systems. 
An investigation of this issue in the German and the U.S. federal sys-
tems will illustrate that scrutiny in fact-finding is much more complex 
in an adversarial system, where there are a plethora of ways to test the 
credibility and reliability of evidence, and where scholars have already  
4.
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suggested solutions for new generations of digital evidence.5 Because of 
an inherent lack of means to evaluate reliability and credibility of evi-
dence in an inquisitorial system like that of Germany, a new legal path-
way to do so would need to be established should it endeavor to create 
means of systematically evaluating machine evidence in criminal fact- 
finding. That said, the inquisitorial tradition of gradually building a 
case file and relying on out-of-court statements could more readily 
allow a thorough evaluation and simultaneous paper documentation of 
complex evidence testing that would be available to all parties from the 
beginning. Examining the performance of an AI-driven tool requires 
time and successive trial runs, in addition to experimenting with the 
machine and a detailed record showing all results. A thorough exami-
nation by a court-appointed expert who provides the results to both 
parties is potentially a more feasible way to evaluate evidence that, de-
spite being technically complex, must still be presented and explained 
orally in a courtroom. 
This Article argues, from a comparative legal angle, that neither 
the inquisitorial systems prevalent on the European continent, nor the 
adversarial system used in the United States, are prepared for AI in the 
courtroom and thus cannot take advantage of potentially relevant 
machine evidence. While inquisitorial systems have struggled to find 
adequate defense tools to combat this new form of information, adver-
sarial systems have few feasible means of including out-of-court tests 
documenting a thorough vetting of AI-driven devices. This Article pro-
poses significant changes to both systems in anticipation of courts 
across the world being faced with evidence generated by AI and argues 
for an approach that draws from both adversarial and inquisitive legal 
systems. This would include the adversarial systems’ tools to thoroughly 
scrutinize evidence in a partisan setting and the inquisitorial systems’ 
allotment of the time and space needed to assess complex technical evi-
dence outside the courtroom, and its sharing of knowledge among all 
parties in a case file. The ultimate goal of the Article is to provide a new 
approach for the presentation of machine evidence in a criminal trial. 
The Article first provides a brief sketch of machine evidence gener-
ated by AI, using the primary example of traffic accidents involving 
automated driving, whereby data monitoring a human driver’s face for 
drowsiness, the activation of a drowsiness alert, or the driving assistant’s 
5. See Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation of 
Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 721 (2007); Brandon L. Garrett, Big Data and Due Process, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 207 (2014); Christian Chessman, A “Source” of Error: Computer Code, 
Criminal Defendants, and the Constitution, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 179 (2017). 
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assessment of a driver’s conduct could all be potentially relevant evi-
dence. Second, it analyzes how machine evidence generated by AI 
could be introduced into trial by way of experts reporting on their find-
ings or by devising a way to bring the software or machine into the 
courtroom. From the point of ensuring trustworthiness in fact-finding, 
it is difficult to simply introduce machine evidence as some form of 
documentary evidence or relate it to testimonial evidence. Machine evi-
dence may not fall in either category, but instead demands a new evi-
dentiary approach that takes into account that AI, like human 
witnesses, could identify a particular defendant as the perpetrator of 
the crime based on its own evaluation. Therefore, it must be vetted as a 
witness rather than as a tool providing a test result. 
A. Legally Defining AI 
Legal scholars are not the only ones that continue to struggle to 
define technological terms like AI,6 
J. McCarthy et al., A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence 
(Aug. 31, 1955), http://jmc.stanford.edu/articles/dartmouth/dartmouth.pdf. For a more recent 
discussion, see Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Blackbox and the Failure of Intent and Causation, 31 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 889, 898 (2018). 
robot,7 
See Matt Simon, What is a Robot?, WIRED (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/ 
what-is-a-robot/ (describing a range of disagreement); see also Ryan Calo, Robots as Legal Metaphors, 
30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 209, 215 (2016). 
or bot.8 
For purposes of this Article, bots will be defined as automated software capable of 
interacting with human users or other IT systems. See Carlene R. Lebeuf, A Taxonomy of Software 
Bots: Towards a Deeper Understanding of Software Bot Characteristics (Aug. 31, 2018) 
(unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Victoria) (on file with the University of Victoria Libraries) 
(discussing, thoroughly, various definitions of software bot and proposing a new taxonomy); see, 
e.g., Renee DiResta, A New Law Makes Bots Identify Themselves -That’s the Problem, WIRED (July 24, 
2019), https://www.wired.com/story/law-makes-bots-identify-themselves (highlighting the 
potential consequences of California lawmakers’ definition of ‘bot’). 
This difficulty 
points to the rapid and significant developments in technology and sug-
gests that the law has not yet caught up. However, the lack of a statutory 
definition for AI should not inhibit an analysis of how ambient intelli-
gent environments, i.e. those where electronic devices are capable of 
monitoring and responding to human behavior, might impact criminal 
justice. Quite the contrary, an agreed-upon legal definition will only be 
possible if attorneys and legal scholars discuss the various aspects of 
new technology and its potential impact on legal systems. For the pur-
pose of this Article, the focus is on AI-driven systems that observe and 
evaluate the behavior of human users to predict future behavior in 
an attempt to enhance safety while reacting automatically and 
6. 
 
7. 
8. 
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autonomously.9 
Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, You Might Be a Robot, CORNELL L. REV. (2019), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3327602; Chessman, supra note 5, at 206, 220 
n.310; see Esra Vural et al., Drowsy Driver Detection Through Facial Movement Analysis, in HUMAN- 
COMPUTER INTERACTION 6–18 (Michael Lew et al. eds., 2007) (describing drowsiness detection 
systems). 
Such systems can take the shape of a robot or software 
bot,10 but always possess their own agenda, automaticity, and ability to 
autonomously evaluate.11 
B. Methodology 
This Article uses two approaches. The first is an analysis of the sub-
stantive and procedural law around machine evidence in criminal trials 
and the issues that will likely arise regardless of jurisdiction or type of 
legal system. The second is a functional comparative approach based 
on the original work of Zweigert & Ko¨tz.12 The tertium comparationis, or 
most relevant point of comparison, is the means by which trustworthi-
ness is evaluated during criminal fact-finding where machine evidence 
is presented. The German and U.S. federal systems will serve as exam-
ples as they represent contrasting criminal justice systems and both are 
relevant as car-manufacturing nations. 
This Article analyzes statutory provisions, evidentiary rules, and rele-
vant case law pertaining to trustworthiness in fact-finding in each of the 
two jurisdictions, particularly where automated machine-generated evi-
dence is at issue. The use of experts and technical reports is also exam-
ined and illustrates opposing approaches to such evidence. While such a 
legal comparison can never be completely neutral because the meaning 
of any one term can vary vastly across cultures and jurisdictions, it does 
allow for the incorporation of specific judicial concepts within an over-
arching legal reality.13 Here, the concept of trustworthy fact-finding is 
closely tied to divergent underlying values (i.e., trust in citizen jurors 
and judges in the United States versus benches exclusively comprised of 
judges in Germany) and is laden with normative layers that may distort 
the validity of the comparative findings if not contextualized properly.14  
9.  
10. Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 530–31 (2015). 
11. Id. 
12. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KO¨TZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 33 (3d ed. 1998). 
13. Axel Tschentscher, Dialektische Rechtsvergleichung–Zur Methode der Komparatistik im o¨ffentlichen 
Recht, 17 JURISTENZEITUNG 807 (2007) (Ger.). 
14. Annelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 221, 225 (1999); For an example of comparative contextualization, see Mirjan R. 
Damasˇka, Of Hearsay and Its Analogues, 76 MINN. L. REV. 425, 431 (1991–1992). 
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It is the objective of any functional approach15 to look beyond the nor-
mative layers and serve as a tool to analyze the specific factual problems 
of machine evidence in criminal courts, referencing the process tied 
directly to the more ubiquitous issue of how to evaluate machine evi-
dence, which will eventually be an issue for all jurisdictions. 
II. MACHINE EVIDENCE GENERATED BY AI 
The following paragraphs argue that automated driving raises novel, 
yet intertwined, issues in a variety of criminal justice domains. 
Unresolved issues of criminal responsibility in substantive law will lead 
to evidentiary problems where human-robot interactions cause harm 
because a lack of clarity around whether AI shares criminal responsibil-
ity with the human driver results in confusion about how AI-generated 
machine data shall be treated. Is it to be considered a witness providing 
expert or percipient testimony or should it be categorized as a state-
ment by a co-defendant? 
A. Automated Driving 
Automated driving is an everyday example of the development of 
technology that has led to AI monitoring humans. As this technology 
progresses, humans will increasingly be sharing the wheel with so-called 
“driving assistants,” or software bots that support the human driver’s 
performance and assist or even take over driving in specific situations.16 
In the case of the latter, it is unclear, however, who will be seen as the 
driver at any given moment, and this has significant consequences for 
liability.17 
Automated driving technology is already capable of carrying out 
complex series of actions independent of the human driver. These sys-
tems monitor the vehicle’s position in the lane and the driver’s steering 
pattern, body temperature, and facial movements (particularly ocular 
15. Oliver Brand, Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of Comparative Legal 
Studies, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405, 415 (2007) (promulgating another functional comparative 
theory, a variant of which this author uses). 
16. See, e.g., Markus Enzweiler, The Mobile Revolution–Machine Intelligence for Autonomous Vehicles, 
57 INFO. TECH. 199 (2015). 
17. Sabine Gless, Emily Silverman, & Thomas Weigend, If Robots Cause Harm, Who is to Blame? 
Self-driving Cars and Criminal Liability, 19 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 412 (2016); Susanne Beck, Robotics and 
Criminal Law. Negligence, Diffusion of Liability and Electronic Personhood, in DIGITIZATION AND THE 
LAW 41, 46 (Eric Hilgendorf & Jochen Feldle eds., 2018); Sabine Gless & Thomas Weigend, 
Intelligente Agenten und das Strafrecht, 126 ZEITSCHRIFT FU¨R DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 
561, 578 (2014) (Ger.). 
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movement).18 They are able to learn a driver’s typical posture, head 
position, blink rate, facial expressions, and steering patterns. Where 
anomalies are detected, the driver is warned to stop and take a break 
(e.g., with a blinking orange coffee cup sign). While some driver assis-
tance technology may appear almost toy-like, systems that monitor a 
human’s driving behavior are crucial where the human relinquishes 
control of the vehicle. At this stage, the automated driving technology 
is the primary driver, but the human nevertheless must respond to a 
request to intervene and take over control if the driving assistants can-
not handle a particular situation.19 Therefore, take-over-request (TOR) 
devices are constantly monitoring whether the human driver appears 
capable of doing so when necessary.20 
As many accidents are caused by sleepy drivers, drowsiness detection 
systems may be considered crucial safety features capable of observing 
human drivers and recording their actions and reactions. The EU re-
vised its General Safety Regulations to designate drowsiness detections 
systems as mandatory safety features in European vehicles beginning in 
2022.21 The technology is likely to build upon the rapid development 
and impressive success of facial recognition technology and is part of a 
growing industry investing in machine-human interfaces involving 
human monitoring.22 
See Jasper Gielen & Jean-Marie Aerts, Feature Extraction and Evaluation for Driver Drowsiness 
Detection Based on Thermoregulation, APPLIED SCIENCES 2019, Aug. 30, 2019, at 3555; for information 
about EU technology, see also EUROPEAN COMMISSION, IN-VEHICLE DETECTION AND WARNING DEVICES, 
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/road_safety/specialist/knowledge/fatique/countermeasures/in_ 
vehicle_detection_and_warning_devices_en (last visited Feb. 6, 2020). 
Although futuristic, cars with standard drowsiness detention systems 
and other features able to continually monitor human drivers are not 
science fiction. In addition to the EU, a number of jurisdictions already 
18. Yanchao Dong et al., Driver Inattention Monitoring System for Intelligent Vehicles: A Review, 12 
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INTELLIGENT TRANSP. SYS. 596 (2011); Luis M. Bergasa et al., Real-Time 
System for Monitoring Driver Vigilance, 7 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INTELLIGENT TRANSP. SYS. 63 (2006). 
19. Madeline Roe, Who’s Driving That Car? An Analysis of Regulatory and Potential Liability 
Frameworks for Driverless Cars, 60 B.C.L. REV. 315, 319 (2019). 
20. Cf. Vivien Melcher et al., Take-Over Requests for Automated Driving, 3 PROCEDIA 
MANUFACTURING 2867 (2015); Tobias Vogelpohl et al., Asleep at the Automated Wheel—Sleepiness and 
Fatigue During Highly Automated Driving, 126 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 70 (2018); Joel 
Gonc¸alves et al., Drowsiness in Conditional Automation: Proneness, Diagnosis and Driving Performance 
Effects, 2016 INST. OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS ENG’RS (IEEE) 19TH INT’L CONF. ON 
INTELLIGENT TRANSP. SYS. (ITSC) 873. 
21. See Regulation (EU) 2019/2144 of 27 November 2019 on Type-Approval Requirements for 
Motor Vehicles and their Trailers, and Systems, Components and Separate Technical Units 
Intended for such Vehicles, as Regards their Safety and the Protection of Vehicle Occupants and 
Vulnerable Road Users, 2019 O.J. (L 325) 1. 
22. 
AI IN THE COURTROOM 
2020] 203 
allow for human-robot interaction in automated driving. For instance, 
in June 2017, Germany passed a regulation on this issue,23 and the 
Swiss Administration is currently considering laws that eventually allow 
for fully automated vehicles.24 
See Aktivita¨ten des Bundes [Federal Activities], BUNDESAMT FU¨R STRASSEN (ASTRA), https://www. 
astra.admin.ch/astra/de/home/themen/intelligente-mobilitaet/aktivitaeten-des-bundes-.html (last 
accessed Mar. 24, 2020). 
Similar laws are also found in several 
U.S. states.25 
For statistics and an autonomous vehicles legislation database, see NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES: SELF-DRIVING VEHICLES ENACTED LEGISLATION, 
www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-self-driving-vehicles-enacted-legislation. 
aspx (last visited Feb. 6, 2020). 
When is a device simply a tool and when does it reach the level of a 
software bot or robot? Driving automation and the use of driving assis-
tants exemplifies both a dividing line and the gray area around the use 
of AI for evidentiary purposes. Using a pragmatic functionality test that 
looks at the factual problems in using such evidence,26 one can differ-
entiate between an AI-driven device that does not convey any message 
of its own (i.e., one that is solely a tool serving a human user) and when 
such a degree of autonomy exists that the information produced would 
be considered AI-generated machine evidence rendering an opinion 
(for instance, assessing a human’s capability to drive a car). Only the lat-
ter would require separate credibility testing in the courtroom.27 Since 
the 1950s, anti-lock brake systems (ABS) have been routinely used in 
automobiles. This safety feature engages automated stutter braking 
designed to prevent the wheels from locking and to maintain contact 
with the road more effectively than with the driver’s braking alone.28 
Anti-lock brakes have become increasingly sophisticated but the tech-
nology is still seen as something that merely responds to a non-human 
entity (the road conditions) and is, therefore, a tool to be used by a 
driver that does not add a message of its own, i.e., it does not evaluate 
human performance during the braking action and provide an 
opinion. 
23. Achtes Gesetz zur €Anderung des Straßenverkehrsgesetzes [Eighth Amendment to the 
Road Traffic Law], BGBL I at 1648 (Ger.). 
24. 
25. 
26. Lemley & Casey, supra note 9. 
27. AI-driven devices, however, differ on the level of conveying a claim of their own. Thus, it 
will be important to differentiate among their complexity, opacity, sensitivity to (case-specific) 
human manipulation, and the concrete use in a case. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 3, at 1979, 1986– 
93, 2002–22. 
28. The automation technology operates at a much faster rate and more effectively than most 
drivers could manage. 
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In comparison, drowsiness detection systems are driving assistant 
software bots designed to enhance driving safety by observing and 
assessing a human driver’s behavior and alerting the driver when he or 
she appears drowsy. These systems can be used when the driver main-
tains control of the vehicle or they may be part of a TOR assistant. The 
technology at work may include surveillance of steering patterns, lane 
position, facial changes in the driver, and the driver’s sitting position.29 
In contrast to ABS, drowsiness detection systems add their own mes-
sage; that is, if they evaluate a driver to be sleepy they will issue an alert. 
This alert is then recorded and stored and could potentially be used as 
evidence in a criminal trial. 
B. Substantive Law 
In recent years, smart devices operating through the use of AI, 
machine learning, and big data, have begun to create new opportuni-
ties in many personal and professional domains. Today, digital assis-
tants can help medical doctors detect patterns indicative of certain 
illnesses; smart houses can provide assistance to aging residents, indi-
viduals with disabilities, or anyone seeking more convenience; and 
automated driving can offer those wanting a little extra free-time dur-
ing their commute the option to share the responsibility of driving.30 
The AI technology that created these new possibilities took roughly 
50 years to become public. When scholars coined the term AI in the 
1950s, they were referring to the science and engineering behind the 
creation of “intelligent machines.”31 It is unlikely they would have 
anticipated the capacity of AI, which can learn to re-organize itself to 
improve efficiency, including rewriting its own code.32 Nevertheless, 
the progress in AI has not been generalized to more holistic problem- 
solving strategies, and instead deals only with specific tasks, which is 
one of the reasons it is called narrow AI.33 
Increases in new possibilities for human-robot interaction also 
increase the possibility of harm as a result of such cooperation, even 
29. See, e.g., Chris Schwarz, John Gaspar, Thomas Miller & Reza Yousefian, The Detection of 
Drowsiness Using a Driver Monitoring System, 20 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 157-161 (2019).  
30. The available technology does not stop there—law enforcement agencies also make wide 
use of new tools, for example, to calculate risk when deciding about bail or release from prison 
and when pursuing suspects or potential offenders. Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 
1245 (2016). 
31. McCarthy, supra note 6; Bathaee, supra note 6. 
32. Calo, supra note 10, at 534. 
33. Scherer, supra note 1, at 358–69. 
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though the expectation is that automated driving or the use of driving 
assistants will enhance safety on the roads. Where such actions cause 
harm, it may become necessary to assign blame.34 In that respect, it could 
be argued that AI-driven devices (or their creators) could be viewed as 
potential defendants that share responsibility with human users. 
As things stand today, we do not consider any form of AI a moral agent 
able to stand trial. Its intelligence is largely one-dimensional and lacks, at 
least for the time being, the capacity to reflect and account for past 
actions.35 Nevertheless, developments in technology have sparked a 
scholarly debate on robot liability that acknowledges while blame is a 
social construct, at some point it could include machines should society 
agree that robots are suitable agents of responsibility.36 The likelihood of 
this development seems to be related to the degree to which AI is able to 
accurately assess information across a variety of domains, as well as their 
ability to develop some sort of reasoning akin to human common sense. 
Even if one subscribes to the traditional views denying AI agency,37 a 
lack of legal liability does not necessarily mean that it must be regarded 
as a neutral bystander. In some ways, a robot or software bot could be 
seen as a secondary (maybe not always legally responsible) suspect, or 
even a proxy suspect for those manufacturing the automobile. So, while 
we view AI as lacking agency and a moral compass, it can have faults 
that most would expect to trigger some form of liability. A drowsiness 
detection system, for instance, can be imprecise or ambiguous—it may 
include biased algorithms or standardized data, or something else 
entirely. Along this line, some AI has been shown to have an “automa-
tion bias” in software design favoring the corporate self-interest.38 
Questions around who is responsible when someone is harmed by a 
car operating autonomously and how to allocate guilt are closely con-
nected.39 Challenges related to substantive law were the first legal issues 
34. Gless, Silverman & Weigend, supra note 17. 
35. Dafni Lima, Could AI Agents Be Held Criminally Liable? Artificial Intelligence and the Challenges 
for Criminal Law, 69 S.C.L. REV. 677 (2018); Ying Hu, Robot Criminals, 52 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 487 
(2019); see also John C. Coffee, No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the 
Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981) (analyzing, broadly, punishment of 
non-humans). 
36. Monika Simmler & Nora Markwalder, Guilty Robots? Rethinking the Nature of Culpability and 
Legal Personhood in an Age of Artificial Intelligence, 30 CRIM. L.F. 1 (2019). 
37. Gless, Silverman, & Weigend, supra note 17, at 412. 
38. Id. 
39. Scherer, supra note 1, at 358, 366–67; Wolfgang Wohlers, Individualverkehr im 21. 
Jahrhundert: das Strafrecht vor neuen Herausforderungen, 3 BASLER JURISTISCHE MITTEILUNGEN 113 
(2016) (Ger.). 
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to emerge, and it is likely that our conceptualization of agency, how 
guilt should be allocated, and who constitutes a perpetrator or accom-
plice will have to change with more AI in our lives. Until now, substan-
tive criminal law has tended to focus on humans as moral agents, 
capable actors, and occasionally criminal risk-takers. While it is true 
that domestic lawmakers have become more receptive to the idea that 
non-humans, such as corporations, can be criminally responsible, pros-
ecutions continue to be rooted in the idea that only human action is 
subject to criminal liability.40 
C. AI and the Evidentiary Cycle in Criminal Trials 
Machine evidence, like other forms of technology that came before, 
has the potential to provide new sources of information and, thus, a 
chance for more accurate fact-finding in criminal trials. However, the 
use of technology with inherent black box problems, i.e., an inability to 
explain a certain result, in a criminal proceeding comes at a price. 
Triers of fact will have to decide whether to trust an AI-generated state-
ment that can only partially be explained by experts. In the past, courts 
have opposed the use of forensic tools, like breathalyzers, noting that 
they act as “magic black box[es] assisting the prosecution in convicting 
citizens.” 41 Courts would be wise to be skeptical as AI becomes more 
embedded in future generations of forensic tools. Machine evidence 
generated by AI in consumer products, such as driving assistants, poses 
new challenges in light of the fact that it was developed as a solution to 
a consumer need and was not meant to be used as a forensic evidentiary 
tool. 
It may initially appear unlikely that increased AI use in our daily lives 
would result in the increased importance of machine evidence in crimi-
nal trials to establish facts, particularly given courts’ hesitation to use all 
available technology in the past (e.g., polygraphs), but continued tech-
nological development may result in a shift in judges’ attitudes. As AI 
becomes more ubiquitous, and if such technology is deemed to be an 
accurate assessment of human conduct, more people may be willing to 
accept it as a reliable and trustworthy source of information. Despite 
this possibility, it remains unclear if and how such information would 
be admitted into a court of law. Long before AI came along, other 
40. See Sabine Gless & Sylwia Broniszewska-Emdin (eds.), Prosecuting Corporations for Violations of 
International Criminal Law: Jurisdictional Issues, 88 INT’L REV. OF PENAL L. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1 (2017) 
(providing a comparative overview). 
41. State v. Lance, No. 48-2012-CT-000017-A /A, slip op. at 24 (Fla. Orange County Ct. Sept. 
22, 2014). 
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technological developments were creating new forms of evidence (e.g., 
DNA testing) that, once brought into criminal trials, highlighted the 
unpreparedness of the criminal procedural process.42 
1. From Silent Witnesses to Digital Analytical Tools 
With the emergence of every new type of recording technology, 
courts face the question of whether the means of registration or docu-
mentation is reliable, accurate, and objective.43 Going forward, this pro-
cess will be referred to as the evidentiary life cycle.44 These cycles are of 
fundamental interest because the legal questions that arise go beyond 
the evidentiary level to important constitutional issues like the 
Confrontation Clause. They also raise basic questions with regard to 
the use of new technology for fact-finding in criminal trials and the 
foundation for expert evidence. From a comparative point of view, it is 
interesting to note that presently the debates in the United States 
appear to be more focused on the right to confront adverse testimony45 
while in Germany the argument is (still) predominantly framed as a pri-
vacy issue.46 
42. Murphy, supra note 5, at 728–44. 
43. See James E. Bibart, Metadata in Digital Photography: The Need for Protection and Production of 
this Silent Witness, 44 CAP. U.L. REV. 789 (2016). 
44. See infra Part III.B.3. 
45. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 5, at 775; Roth, supra note 3, at 1979, 1986–93, 2002–22; Joseph 
C. Celentino, Face-to-Face with Facial Recognition Evidence: Admissibility Under the Post-Crawford 
Confrontation Clause, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1317, 1331–33 (2016). For debates regarding privacy 
issues, see Katherine Strandbergh, Home, Home on the Web: The Fourth Amendment and Technosocial 
Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614 (2011); Jason M. Weinstein, William L. Drake & Nicholas P. Silverman, 
Privacy vs. Public Safety: Prosecuting and Defending Criminal Cases in the Post-Snowden Era, 52 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 729 (2015). 
46. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 2, 2008, 1 BvR 
370/07 (§ 169) (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFGE], [Federal Constitutional Court] 
Mar. 3, 2004, 1 BvR 2378/98 and 1 BvR 1084/99 (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFGE] 
Apr. 4, 2006, 1 BvR 518/02 (Ger.); see generally JAN-CHRISTOPH WEHAGE, DAS GRUNDRECHT 
AUF GEWA¨HRLEISTUNG DER VERTRAULICHKEIT UND INTEGRITA¨T VON INFORMATIONSVERARBE- 
ITUNGSSYSTEMEN (2013) (Ger.); see also Tobias Singelnstein & Benjamin Derin, Das Gesetz zur 
effektiveren und praxistauglicheren Ausgestaltung des Strafverfahrens, 70 NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT 2646, 2647–52 (2017) (Ger.); Sabine Gless, Wenn das Haus mitho¨rt: Beweisverbote 
im digitalen Zeitalter, 38 STRAFVERTEIDIGER 671, 675–77 (2018) (Ger.). A more recent debate does 
however include considerations on reliability: Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional 
Court] Karlsruhe, July 16, 2019, 1 Rb10 Ss 291/19 (Baden Wu¨rttemberg) (Ger.); 
Verfassungsgerichtshof [BAYVERFGH] [Constitutional Court] Apr. 27, 2018, Lv 1/18 
(Saarbru¨cken) (Ger.); Eric Hilgendorf,“Die Schuld ist immer zweifellos”? Offene Fragen bei 
Tatsachenfeststellung und Beweis mit Hilfe ,,intelligenter” Maschinen, in BEWEIS 229, 238–39 (Thomas 
Fischer ed., 2019) (Ger.); Dominik Brodowski, Die Beweisfu¨hrung mit digitalen Spuren und das 
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It is hoped that eventually legal scholars will join in a single debate 
around the relevance and reliability of AI-generated data during inter-
actions with humans as well as on the resulting privacy issues. On the 
one hand, some may argue in favor of this new and seemingly more pre-
cise assessment instrument, hoping for a more accurate establishment 
of facts and laying aside privacy and other concerns. On the other 
hand, critics might describe such technology as invasive and error- 
prone, citing flaws in its design and/or the machine learning technol-
ogy used. It is the functionality of the technology that draws the line 
between classic silent witnesses (like an analog video camera or an ABS 
breaking system), digital forensic analytical tools (like DNA testing kits 
or forensic facial recognition), and AI-driven devices (like drowsiness 
detection systems), which convey messages of their own through an in-
dependent evaluation of the situation. 
With technology of some form or another in all areas of our lives, it is 
not surprising that digital evidence has already made its way into crimi-
nal proceedings.47 Interestingly, the term “digital evidence” is used 
widely in textbooks and legal journals, yet it does not appear to be a 
technical legal term but instead a description of a phenomenon (or 
need) in criminal investigations and courtrooms for information stored 
or transmitted in binary form.48 Digital evidence can be found on hard 
drives of computers, in cloud-based storage, on mobile phones or per-
sonal digital assistants, flash drives, or even digital cameras. Digital evi-
dence can provide access to a large variety of information, including 
the content of an email, the identities of senders and recipients of 
emails, surveillance reports from camera footage, mobile location 
tracking records,49 browser tracking information, or social network 
mapping data. It can be “small data” or some aspect of big data50 and it 
can be generated by humans or machines. Currently, it is most often 
used to prosecute crimes51 but, like DNA testing, it could eventually 
Unmittelbarkeitsprinzip, in DIGITALISIERUNG DER GERICHTLICHEN VERFAHREN UND DAS PROZESSRECHT 
83–93 (Almuth Buschmann et al. eds., 2018) (Ger.) (discussing the application of best evidence 
rules in digital evidence in German procedure). 
47. Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 279, 285– 
306 (2005). 
48. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, “Dearest Property”: Digital Evidence and the History of Private “Papers” as 
Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 53–54 (2013); Kerr, supra note 47. 
49. See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Erik Luna, Digital Innocence, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 981, 1032– 
38 (2014). 
50. Garrett, supra note 5, at 208–09. 
51. Historically, new technology touted as “objective” was first used against defendants, but 
more recently defendants have (at least in part) turned this concept around. Roth, supra note 30, 
at 1254–64. 
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become helpful for the defense as well,52 as users are increasingly aware 
of the ability of consumer products to provide alibis. 
Information coded in “0s” and “1s” poses the immediate problem for 
the court in that it has to be translated into an analogue form by experts 
to be of any use.53 Sometimes the expert can only access the informa-
tion after it has been decrypted, and additional specialists are needed 
to provide explanations about how it was obtained and what it means. 
Nevertheless, so long as the issue is solely the storage format—that is, 
the information is simply in a different form (e.g., an email instead of a 
written note, a jpg file instead of a printed photo, etc.), criminal justice 
systems have been able to adapt without too much difficulty. 
However, technology has continued to develop rapidly, and digital 
evidence in criminal investigations quickly became more complex: 
breathalyzers were equipped with smart technology, DNA kits provid-
ing personalized genetic information were made available to the pub-
lic, and law enforcement no longer had exclusive access to such 
technology.54 
See, e.g., Stacy Cowley & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, These Machines Can Put You in Jail. Don’t 
Trust Them, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/03/business/drunk- 
driving-breathalyzer.html; Matthias Gafni & Lisa M. Krieger, Here’s the ‘Open-Source’ Genealogy DNA 
Website That Helped Crack the Golden State Killer Case, MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 30, 2019), www. 
mercurynews.com/2018/04/26/ancestry-23andme-deny-assisting-law-enforcement-in-east-area- 
rapist-case (illustrating the successful use of an “open source” genealogy website). 
Such digital analytical tools can be AI-driven but are first- 
and-foremost measuring tools and are limited in that they are used to 
produce test results such as the alcohol content in someone’s breath.55 
Even so, the basic question remains: when (and why) does the trier of 
fact start to trust such technology? When do we get to a point where the 
technology becomes so trusted that it is no longer sufficiently chal-
lenged? And when could new doubts arise about its trustworthiness? 
In 2007, Erin Murphy presented a taxonomy dividing first-generation 
forensic evidence (e.g., fingerprint analysis, ballistics) from second-gen-
eration evidence,56 primarily based upon the first generation’s limited 
application, observational and mechanical functions, and narrow 
design. Second-generation forensic evidence was characterized as more 
complex and scientifically robust, which resulted in much broader use 
(e.g., DNA-analysis, location tracking). 
52. See Fairfield & Luna, supra note 49, at 990 (championing the demand to turn digital 
devices into proof-of-innocence technologies). 
53. Kerr, supra note 47, at 298–99. 
54. 
55. Roth, supra note 30, at 1254–64 (providing a history of such tools). 
56. Murphy, supra note 5. 
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Digital analytical tools in forensic settings can be distinguished from 
first-generation evidence (like dactyloscopy or graphology) because 
they are guided by source code rather than human expertise57 and their 
underlying mechanisms are considerably more difficult to see at 
work.58 This lack of transparency alone creates a substantial risk to trust-
worthiness in criminal fact-finding because potential flaws are difficult 
to detect by the trier of fact. While the trustworthiness of DNA tests has 
recently triggered a lively debate, the underlying technologies are quite 
different because DNA tests lack the agency that AI can achieve, includ-
ing the ability to monitor the surrounding environment, evaluate human 
behavior and act autonomously. As such, machine-generated evidence 
must be considered a third-generation type of forensic evidence. 
2. Digital Layers and Trustworthy Fact-Finding 
With each additional layer of digital complexity, access to relevant in-
formation becomes more difficult and requires expertise that the trier 
of fact might not possess. Additional issues arise from laws regulating 
the reliability and credibility of evidence which impact not only the 
admissibility of evidence (a key tenant of adversarial proceedings), but 
also its weight (a particularly important aspect in establishing facts in 
the inquisitorial model).59 
a. The Black Box Problem and Expert Evidence 
While a specific component of a drowsiness detection system in a car 
might be visible to the user, the process behind its evaluation is not 
entirely transparent to the user or a trier of fact in a courtroom. Even 
experts called upon to explain machine evidence in court encounter 
limitations in their ability to comprehensibly explain how an AI-driven 
device evaluates a human user’s conduct or demonstrate a clear chain 
of causality.60 These problems constitute the “black box problem” in 
machine evidence that researchers are currently investigating.61 To 
date, research has shown that the degree to which AI can be explained 
57. Source code is the fundamental component of the IT program driving the action created 
by a human programmer. 
58. Roth, supra note 30, at 1269–76. 
59. Thomas Weigend, Evidence Law im anglo-amerikanischen Strafverfahren, in BEWEIS 253–65 
(Thomas Fischer ed., 2019) (Ger.). 
60. See Finale Doshi-Velez & Mason Kortz, Accountability of AI Under the Law: The Role of 
Explanation (Berkman Klein Ctr. Working Grp. on Explanation and the Law, Berkman Klein Ctr. 
for Internet & Soc’y, Working Paper, 2017). 
61. See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the 
Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1160–1, 1167 (2017) (discussing black box problems); 
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is inversely related to system accuracy (or other performance objec-
tives).62 Nevertheless, we still must use human experts to explain 
machine data to the trier of fact to achieve sufficient understanding 
and trustworthy fact-finding. This is the case despite the fact that the 
machine is the superior “expert” when it comes to accurate data collec-
tion and evaluation. 
The rationale of using experts to improve the trustworthiness in the 
establishment of facts where the trier of fact lacks the relevant knowl-
edge63 is the same in both the adversarial and inquisitorial systems, but 
the means of doing so differ widely. In an adversarial system, expert wit-
nesses are typically called by parties, based upon their certification, 
skills, or experience, to testify before a judge or jury to assist their 
case.64 In an inquisitorial system, expertise is sought by the bench 
where they have determined that they lack the relevant knowledge;65 
expert testimony is generally given orally during the public hearing but 
can also be provided in written reports. 
Regardless of whether the fact-finders are jurors or members of a 
bench, understanding the issues around the reliability of devices that 
autonomously make assessments and that may (or may not) be useful 
in reconstructing the facts of a case exceeds the knowledge and under-
standing of an average human. As such, the use of complex technology 
in fact-finding makes expert evidence crucial in both adversarial and 
inquisitorial justice systems. 
b. AI-Generated Machine Evidence 
The focus of this Article is machine data generated by a consumer 
product during an AI-driven interaction. Related to this, Andrea Roth 
coined the term “machine testimony” or machine evidence to distin-
guish mere tools that assist humans in conveying information from intel-
ligent machines that can convey a message of their own by registering 
see also FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY 
AND INFORMATION (2015) (providing a more detailed discussion). 
62. See Doshi-Velez & Kortz, supra note 60, at 2. 
63. See FED. R. EVID. 702. But see Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal 
Rules of Evidence: Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 43 (1986); 
BRUCE D. SALES & DANIEL W. SHUMAN, EXPERTS IN COURT: RECONCILING LAW, SCIENCE, AND 
PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE (2005) (discussing the ongoing issue of expert trustworthiness). With 
a specific focus on digital tools: Jennifer N. Mellon, Manufacturing Convictions: Why Defendants Are 
Entitled to the Data Underlying Forensic DNA Kits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1097, 1101 (2001). 
64. FED. R. EVID. 706. 
65. The bench is authorized to appoint a “neutral” expert in appropriate cases. 
Strafprozeßordnung [StPO] [German Code of Criminal Procedure] as amended Apr. 7, 1987, 
§ 73 [hereinafter StPO]. 
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and assessing specific data based upon the device’s design and algo-
rithms.66 The underlying question is whether the same safeguards that 
are in place for human statements should apply when machine data is 
offered as truth of the matter asserted. This would include something 
equivalent to the right to confront (and impeach) a witness and the 
exclusion of associated evidence where the witness cannot be 
adequately confronted. 
This debate primarily focuses on forensic instruments used in crimi-
nal litigation—that is, tools that produce evidence subsequently offered 
as fact. The issues around the applicability of digital tools engineered 
for forensic use are different and not the focus of this Article. In the 
case of machine-generated data, it is produced without regard for crim-
inal proceedings and, more importantly, includes observations and 
assessments of humans by machines. 
In the case of drowsiness detection systems, data from various sources 
is registered, each of which can act as a separate piece of evidence. 
Such data can include things like observation of facial features, an 
assessment that a driver is sleepy, deployment of an alert to the driver, 
and the driver’s response to the alert. While some of this data does not 
convey an assessment by the machine, a large portion of it does involve 
evaluation by software bots and the line between traditional tools and 
robots becomes blurred. With regard to fact-finding in criminal pro-
ceedings, addressing the issue of trustworthiness in evidentiary produc-
tion will be crucial to distinguish tools from the source delivering the 
message. 
c. Consumer Products Generating Machine Evidence 
Digital interfaces linking humans and robots are regularly designed 
as part of a technological solution for a consumer product, such as 
automated driving, which offers vast possibilities if they could also be 
used for law enforcement purposes. 
However, tapping into the potential of AI-driven devices also raises a 
multitude of evidentiary issues and a number of problems for establish-
ing facts in criminal proceedings, some of which have already been 
mentioned (see supra II.C.2.a). Robots and software bots offer an 
almost limitless and indefatigable capacity to register information in 
their environment and can provide data beyond simple measurements 
as a result of their ability to continuously record, assess, and document 
66. See Roth, supra note 3, at 1979, 1986–93, 2002–22; Roth, supra note 30, at 1301 (coining the 
terms “machine testimony” and “automated proof”); cf. Chessman, supra note 5, at 197, 183, 206, 
222 (using the phrase “evidence created by computer programs”). 
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human behavior. In the case of automated driving, this constant moni-
toring provides a large amount of data to support the determination of 
a human’s fitness to drive. 
Despite the capacity to collect vast amounts of data, AI-driven devices 
cannot explain for themselves how they evaluate human conduct or 
reach a decision. Therefore, law enforcement and the courts must be 
cautious about what they learn from machine-generated data. 
d. Meeting the Evidentiary Challenge 
The previous explanations illustrate that machine evidence is a chal-
lenge in many respects. First, the information generated by AI is stored 
digitally and must be retrieved and subsequently interpreted by an 
expert. Second, and possibly more important, is the issue that using AI 
to assess a driver’s alertness could be interpreted as a professional state-
ment and may not be explainable in detail because human comprehen-
sion is limited by the black box problem.67 Despite the presence of 
these issues, AI may take on the role of an eye-witness and implicate a 
defendant in wrongdoing. Concern that triers of fact will place unyield-
ing trust in such statements, as is occasionally the case with eyewit-
nesses, seems warranted. 
To date, the specific means by which machine evidence can be reli-
ably translated into digestible information are unclear and the relevant 
admissibility standards remain unresolved.68 The extent of the black 
box problem appears to be directly related to the accuracy of the infor-
mation generated by robots, which limits experts’ explanations and 
other means of testing trustworthiness. The fundamental differences 
between machine-generated evidence and more traditional types of evi-
dence renders typical means of scrutinizing AI statements impossible. 
Unlike human witnesses, neither robots nor software programs can be 
put on the witness stand and asked to take an oath to tell the truth. 
They are also not deterred from lying by the threat of being prosecuted 
for perjury. Despite all these problems, machine evidence generated by 
AI during collaborative actions with humans still holds the promise of 
vast amounts of information potentially relevant to criminal investiga-
tions, especially with human-robot interaction on the rise. 
67. Daniel J. Grimm, The Dark Data Quandary, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 761, 819 (2019). 
68. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Of Black Boxes, Instruments, and Experts: Testing the Validity of 
Forensic Science, 5 EPISTEME 343 (2008); Bathaee, supra note 6. 
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3. The Evidentiary Cycle and Consumer Products Assisting Law 
Enforcement 
Case law69 and scholarship70 suggest a predictable life cycle for many 
types of new evidence, beginning with the assumption that it is initially 
too new to be reliable. It then becomes new but subject to testing and then gen-
erally reliable but occasionally improperly applied. Finally, many types of evi-
dence reach a point of being blindly trusted.71 With the benefit of 
hindsight, we know this evidentiary life cycle is not irreversible—DNA- 
testing, for instance, was once blindly trusted but is now under 
increased scrutiny.72 That said, reversing the evidentiary cycle is an 
uphill battle and one that is often preceded by a great deal of human 
suffering. Therefore, the issue of the initial admissibility of machine evi-
dence becomes of particular importance when it is proffered as a 
potential type of third-generation forensic evidence. This is because 
the evidence in question is automatically produced from an AI-driven 
human-robot interaction through the use of consumer products.73 
While seemingly objective, this evidence might be prone to error, and 
must still be explained (at least in part) through the use of experts.74 
Most of us today believe that increased use of machine data in fact- 
finding, including forensic (e.g., DNA-testing) and non-forensic (e.g., 
GPS tracking) technology, has resulted in an overall increase in  
69. See, e.g., United States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1448 (8th Cir. 1996); US v. McCluskey, No. 
10-2735 JCH, 2013 WL 1239717 at 2 (D. N.M July 2, 2013); Texas v. Josiah Sutton (District Court 
of Harris County, Cause No. 800450) (2003); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1989); State v. Butterfield, 27 P.3d 1133, 1143 (Utah 2001); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S. 
E.2d 785, 797–98 (Va. 1989). 
70. See JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW AND CONTROVERSY IN THE MAKING OF 
DNA PROFILING (Rutgers University Press 2007). 
71. This observation has been made by Richard Myers. Richard Myers, Remarks at the Data, 
Technology and Criminal Law Workshop at Duke University (April 5–6, 2019); see also United 
States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1448 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that “the reliability of the PCR 
method of DNA analysis is sufficiently well established to permit the courts of this circuit to take 
judicial notice of it in future cases . . . ” but it remains to be seen when this method will be 
questioned again). 
72. Frederika A. Kaestle, Ricky A. Kittles, Andrea L. Roth & Edward J. Ungvarsky, Database 
Limitations on the Evidentiary Value of Forensic Mitochondrial DNA Evidence, 43 AM. CRIM. L. Q. 53, 85– 
87 (2006). 
73. Roth, supra note 3, at 1975. 
74. See infra Part III.B.5. Again, for the purposes of this Article, it is irrelevant whether the data 
would be proffered as direct evidence (of the fact that the TOR-request has been launched) or as 
circumstantial evidence (of sleepiness if the drowsiness detection system observed body signals 
that it registered as signs of driver fatigue). 
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accuracy and objectivity in reconstructing the facts of a case.75 
However, beyond the immense privacy concerns, this assumption car-
ries with it the risk of blindly trusting machine accuracy and is counter-
intuitive given that most people, including judges and jurors in 
criminal cases, do not understand the underlying technology. 
While scholars in adversarial systems (especially in the United States) 
are increasingly denouncing blind faith in this opaque machinery, cit-
ing erroneous breathalyzers used in the 1960s and misidentifications 
through DNA tests in the 2000s, an equally pronounced debate has not 
surfaced in Europe. Additionally, despite the available scholarship in 
the United States, the majority of U.S. courts are hesitant to heed 
requests to scrutinize evidence the public has already deemed safe.76 
The implication here is that the threshold for relevance and proba-
tive value, which, once met, results in a presumption of admissibility for 
useful evidence (as opposed to evidence designed to mislead and con-
fuse the factfinder), may need to be elevated. If trust has been estab-
lished by the smooth operation of an AI-driven system, say an 
automated digital driving assistant, judges may be especially skeptical 
when a defendant attempts to challenge its supposed flawless function-
ing during a criminal trial. This issue may be related to the fact that 
judges, like anyone else, are not capable of possessing an expert degree 
of knowledge on every topic that enters their courtroom. While under-
standable, this limitation may also result in prohibiting the defense 
from effectively challenging the relevance of certain expert evidence 
under the auspices that such a challenge has a high likelihood of mis-
leading jurors.77 
It is unclear how this general concern will translate in today’s digital 
era. It is likely that the issue of evaluating the trustworthiness of 
machine evidence will become more pressing with an increase in AI- 
driven consumer products, like automated cars. Along with an increase 
in product volume and popularity, trustworthiness will also be impor-
tant as machine evidence moves through the evidentiary life cycle, par-
ticularly from the phase of too new to be reliable to new but subject to testing. 
There are a number of reasons that the current state of machine evi-
dence remains in the too new phase. First, there have been no certifica-
tion processes to date to support the reliability of the data generated 
75. Roth, supra note 3, at 1975–76. 
76. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Computer Source Code: A Source of the Growing Controversy over 
the Reliability of Automated Forensic Techniques, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 99–101 (2016). 
77. See, e.g., Kaestle, supra note 72, at 81–86 (discussing DNA evidence); Celentino, supra note 
45, at 1325–30 (discussing Facial Recognition Technology). 
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for use in criminal trials because the products have not been designed 
to accurately record specific data for use in fact-finding in a criminal 
trial, but rather to meet a broader consumer demand. Further, the data 
is owned by private individuals or corporations and stored in cloud- 
based systems where it may also be encrypted and shielded by manufac-
turers claiming trade secret privileges.78 
At this point, governments have little to no information about the 
reliability of any item of machine evidence generated by a consumer 
product. In the case of drowsiness detection systems, unbeknownst to 
the driver, the creators of the AI monitoring human behavior may be 
inclined to design the algorithms in such a way that it shifts blame from 
the car to the human79 to protect the corporate self-interest described 
above. 
There are many ways in which a robot’s output can be imprecise or 
ambiguous, including human error at the programming stage, biased 
algorithms, or biased standardization data, just to name a few. Relative 
to government devices that are more regulated, consumer products 
that generate data may be more likely to have hidden (potentially unin-
tentional) subjectivities. Even assuming that a manufacturer using nar-
row AI would strive for optimal neutrality of machine evidence, 
computer engineers unintentionally (and unavoidably) create biases.80 
See, e.g., CATHY O’NEAL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION (2016) (discussing discriminatory 
algorithms and their impact on society); see also MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART TECHNOLOGIES 
AND THE (ENDS) OF LAW: NOVEL ENTANGLEMENTS OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 34 (2015); Emily 
Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U.L. REV. 1277, 1325–27 (2018). For a 
reflection of the specific application (using the example of facial recognition technology), see 
GEORGETOWN CTR. ON PRIVACY AND TECH., THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP, https://www.law.georgetown. 
edu/privacy-technology-center/publications/the-perpetual-line-up.  
In the case of drowsiness detection systems, the choice of a particular 
design to capture a driver’s face or body position and the trade-offs 
given to achieve functionality could have dire consequences. For exam-
ple, variations in eyelid positioning across ethnicities would need to be 
accounted for so as not to erroneously interpret individual variations as 
a sign of sleepiness. Such safeguards must be put into place to ensure a 
certain degree of transparency and authenticity.81 
78. See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice 
System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018) (describing the debate over resolving conflicting interests 
between a defendant’s right to a defense and trade secrets); Natalie Ram, Innovating Criminal 
Justice, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 659 (2017). 
79. Cf. Roth, supra note 30, at 1272. 
80. 
 
81. Berman, supra note 80, at 1325–27. 
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III. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE OF AI IN THE COURTROOM 
The following comparative position proposes significant changes to 
the German and U.S. criminal justice systems with respect to machine- 
generated evidence. While Germany must strengthen the legal tools 
available to defendants, the United States needs to continue to broaden 
the defense’s access to forensic evidence by allowing out-of-court state-
ments and reports by experts to be admitted and shared with both par-
ties in order to optimize the objective scientific evidence provided to 
the trier of fact. 
A. In Pursuit of the Truth 
The primary goal of fact-finding in any criminal proceeding is to es-
tablish the truth.82 In Germany and the United States, there is strong 
public interest in determining the truth with the hope that it is on the 
basis of “true” facts that courts make decisions of guilt or innocence.83 
The fact that both systems today conclude most criminal proceedings 
with some type of plea bargaining is not necessarily opposed to their 
truth-seeking commitment as both systems operate under the assump-
tion that a defendant’s confession reveals the truth.84 
Certainly, both legal systems share similar rules around the founda-
tion required for trustworthy fact-finding, including independent and 
impartial judges and formal requirements around evidentiary proceed-
ings. Despite this shared foundation, adversarial and inquisitorial trials 
82. StPO § 244, para. 2 (stating that “[i]n order to establish the truth, the court shall, proprio 
motu, extend the taking of evidence to all facts and means of proof relevant to the decision”); 
Thomas Weigend, Should We Search for the Truth, and Who Should Do it?, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L.& COM. 
REG. 389, 389 (2011). However, neither the U.S. Constitution nor federal law expressly require 
investigators, prosecutors, or courts to seek the truth. Seemingly to the contrary, the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure suggest that certain principles should guide interpretation “to 
provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding, to secure simplicity in procedure 
and fairness in administration, and to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay.” FED. R. CRIM. 
PROC. R. 2. Case law does, however, point to the search for truth as an underlying guiding 
principle in criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Tehan v. United States, 383 U.S. 406, 416 (1966); 
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 
(1986). For a more detailed discussion, see Jenia Iontcheva Turner, The Exclusionary Rule as a 
Symbol of the Rule of Law, 67 SMU L. REV. 821, 829 (2014). 
83. Jenia Iontcheva Turner & Thomas Weigend, The Purposes and Functions of Exclusionary Rules: 
A Comparative Overview, in DO EXCLUSIONARY RULES ENSURE A FAIR TRIAL? 255, 260 (Sabine Gless & 
Thomas Richter eds., 2019). 
84. Thomas Weigend, The Potential to Secure a Fair Trial Through Evidence Exclusion: A German 
Perspective, in DO EXCLUSIONARY RULES ENSURE A FAIR TRIAL? 61, 64 (Sabine Gless & Thomas 
Richter eds., 2019). 
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use very different procedural approaches.85 These differences result 
most notably from a divergence in the fact-finding body, which is a 
bench comprised of judges and laypeople in the inquisitorial system 
and a judge or jury in the adversarial system. This disparity shapes evi-
dentiary rules, including how statements are used in establishing facts 
and the necessity of a reasoned verdict that can withstand an appeal.86 
Both jurisdictions’ common goal of pursuing the truth (albeit proce-
durally different), combined with their apparent endorsement of auto-
mated driving and other AI-driven devices, results in an interesting 
comparative study. 
B. AI in Adversarial and Inquisitive Courtrooms 
As humans have been increasingly willing to interact with technology 
and AI-driven devices in recent years, the opportunity to monitor their 
behavior has vastly increased. The resulting machine evidence may 
potentially enhance fact-finding, but at the moment criminal justice sys-
tems around the world are not yet equipped to adequately handle such 
data. They lack specific tools to thoroughly vet its reliability or validity 
and both inquisitorial and adversarial systems must use experts to 
explain such evidence to the trier of fact as it cannot be grasped with 
the naked eye. 
1. Machine Evidence in Modern Day Courtrooms 
Machine evidence does not fit into the conventional evidentiary and 
procedural scheme whereby humans communicate with each other in 
a formalized way in pursuit of the truth. Therefore, one must either cre-
ate an entirely new model of evaluating the reliability of machine evi-
dence in criminal proceedings or rethink the available types of 
evidence and differentiate between possible systemic and judicial weak-
nesses to see if judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys can somehow 
adequately examine such evidence within the framework of their legal 
system.87 
Experts are crucial to the use of machine evidence in a criminal trial. 
They must capture and clarify how particular data is registered in addi-
tion to explaining the impact of a particular machine learning device 
and its possible sources of error relevant to fact-finding. In an adversa-
rial proceeding, expert evidence is commonly used as part of the 
85. Weigend, supra note 59, at 253–265. 
86. Damasˇka, supra note 14, at 426. 
87. Myers, supra note 71. 
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partisan presentation of a case, whereas during an investigation in an 
inquisitive system, the prosecutor will typically commission experts and 
subsequently add their reports to the case file. It is important to note 
that these reports tend to describe methods and explain results, but 
lack information about how raw data is measured or how a digital evi-
dentiary tool is set up and used.88 Thus, before the defense can raise an 
argument about how different forms of evidence should or should not 
enter fact-finding, a certain narrative of the case has already been put 
into place via the case file. If an evidentiary report is in the file, the 
bench may choose to admit the expert evidence based on the written 
report, by calling the expert to testify, or by calling in another expert to 
submit a new report.89 The bench may also anticipate the need for fur-
ther fact gathering and summon other experts at the oral trial 
hearing.90 
In Germany, defense attorneys have access to the entire case file by 
the end of the pretrial investigation and have the ability to ask the court 
to summon an expert to appear at the trial so that he or she may be 
questioned. Where they have serious doubt about an expert’s credibil-
ity, they may bring their own expert to trial (provided resources are 
available), but the bench, as the driving force behind fact-finding, is 
not always required to hear such testimony. German law warrants a 
rejection if, from the point of view of the bench, the alleged fact in 
question has already been clearly proven (or disproven) by the first 
expert opinion.91 Notably, this rule does not apply to cases “where the 
professional competence of the first expert is in doubt, where her opin-
ion is based upon incorrect factual suppositions, where the opinion 
contains contradictions, or where the new expert has means of research 
at his disposal which seem to be superior to the ones of an earlier 
expert.”92 This statutory provision is applied differently depending on 
where in the evidentiary cycle a piece of evidence is; a novel forensic 
technique is more likely to result in the bench allowing the opinion of 
more than one expert, whereas a generally reliable, or even blindly 
88. See, e.g., Oberlandesgericht [OLG] Bamberg, June 13, 2018, 3 Ss Owi 626/18 
(Ger.); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] Karlsruhe, July 16, 2019, 1 Rb10 Ss 291/19 (Ger.), 
Verfassungsgerichtshof [VERFGH] Saarbru¨cken, Apr. 27, 2018, Lv 1/18 (Ger.); Kammergericht 
[KG] Apr. 2, 2019, 3 Ws [B] 97/19 – 122 Ss 43/19 (Ger.) (addressing radar guns used to detect 
speeding drivers). 
89. StPO § 221, § 222, § 244, § 256. 
90. Id. § 245. 
91. Id. § 244, para. 4. 
92. Id. 
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trusted forensic tool will face greater challenges where a second 
expert’s opinion is requested. 
German procedural law developed in the nineteenth century, but 
has been, at least to some extent, influenced by adversarial notions 
since the 1950s as a result of case law from the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), the prominent human rights tribunal based 
on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).93 In particu-
lar, the notion of a fair trial, including the right to examine incriminat-
ing evidence (Art. 6 ECHR) has had a lasting effect on fact-finding in 
Continental Europe and often serves as a sort of backup if the tradi-
tional inquisitorial system lacks adequate protection for the individ-
ual.94 While the idea of challenging the reliability of machine evidence 
using the right to examine an incriminating witness under Article 6, 
paragraph 3(d) of the ECHR95 is unlikely to be embraced by German 
courts anytime soon,96 recent case law from Higher Regional Courts 
(i.e., the highest courts in any given state) does suggest that an increas-
ing number of judges may be open to the idea of allowing access to 
so-called “raw measure data” in order to more thoroughly vet machine 
evidence like digital radar guns.97 These decisions seek to achieve 
“knowledge parity” in an effort to meet the benchmark of European 
case law on Art. 6 ECHR and its “equality of arms” between the prosecu-
tion and defense and to strengthen the defense’s position with regard 
to the bench.98 This concept, while seemingly adversarial, has been said 
to be grounded in both civil and common law traditions and is a conse-
quence of the ECtHR’s attempt to create a cross-jurisdictional notion 
of procedural fairness.99 
This new line of argument, in some ways, parallels the call by scholars 
in the United States that machine evidence be viewed as out-of-court 
93. See Roberto E. Kostoris, European Law and Criminal Justice, in HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 47–56 (Roberto E. Kostoris ed., 2018) (detailing ECtHR’s jurisprudence 
and binding effect on Member State courts); Weigend, supra note 82, at 64 (describing the effect 
in Germany specifically). 
94. See generally JOHN D. JACKSON & SARAH J. SUMMERS, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF CRIMINAL 
EVIDENCE: BEYOND THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS 79–95 (2012). 
95. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
96. Cf. Oberlandesgericht [OLG] Bamberg, June 13, 2018, 3 Ss Owi 626/18 (Ger). 
97. Cf. Oberlandesgericht [OLG] Karlsruhe, July 16, 2019, 1 Rb10 Ss 291/19 (Ger.); 
Verfassungsgerichtshof [VERFGH] Saarbru¨cken, Apr. 27, 2018, Lv 1/18 (granting access to 
measurement data based on Article 6 of the European Human Rights Convention). 
98. Ju¨rgen Cierniak & Holger Niehaus, Neuere Entwicklungen im Recht auf Einsichtnahme in 
Messunterlagen, 14 DEUTSCHES AUTORECHT [DAR] 541, 541–44 (2018) (Ger.). 
99. See Jackson & Summers, supra note 94, at 79–80. 
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testimony offered as truth of the matter asserted (and in need of con-
text).100 Even if one agrees with those who think that AI-driven devices 
should undergo similar credibility testing as witnesses because of their 
design, standardization data, or machine learning software, one must 
also be aware that should this argument be accepted, it could improp-
erly place such machines on similar footing as human witnesses. 
To illustrate this point, if a human passenger in a car was put on the 
stand to testify about a defendant’s driving ability, he or she would be 
questioned about perceptual capacities, potential biases, misjudgment, 
or even intentional lying (with the risk of prosecution and punishment 
for perjury). As of today, AI-driven devices cannot undergo the equiva-
lent of cross-examination even where they are evaluating human users 
and coming to a conclusion, like whether or not a driver has the 
capacity to operate a vehicle. If such determinations by AI are used as 
evidence, it should be subject to scrutiny, especially with respect to the 
design, algorithms, and machine learning/training data. 
This becomes exceptionally complicated given that a thorough evalu-
ation and understanding of the inner workings of an AI-driven device 
can only happen outside the courtroom because of the degree of com-
plexity and the desire for the corporate world to protect their trade 
secrets. As a result, in an adversarial system, this evaluation would not 
be able to be included in a hearing. Instead, experts would appear in 
court to speak about the results of the data retrieved and act as a sort of 
proxy for direct contact with the particular device regarding its reliabil-
ity and validity. 
2. Testing Machine Evidence for Relevance and Reliability 
Only relevant and reliable evidence can be presented in courts in 
Germany or the United States. Although German law lacks an 
explicit blanket rule laying out the requirements of admissibility or 
how to determine the reliability of evidence, courts follow the prin-
ciple that all relevant evidence is to be admitted as a natural part of 
their truth-seeking mission.101 
Despite the fact that this principle is also enshrined in common law, 
the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence memorialize it in Rules 401 and 402. 
100. See Joe¨lle Vuille, Luca Lupa`ria & Franco Taroni, Scientific Evidence and the Right to a Fair 
Trial under Article 6 ECHR, 16 L. PROBABILITY AND RISK 55 (2017); Paul Roberts & Michael 
Stockdale, Introduction: Forensic Science, Evidential Reliability and Institutional Reform, in FORENSIC 
SCIENCE EVIDENCE AND EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY: RELIABILITY THROUGH REFORM? 22 (Paul 
Roberts & Michael Stockdale eds., 2018). 
101. See StPO § 261; see also Weigend, supra note 82, at 389. 
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While only relevant evidence may be admitted, not all relevant evidence 
is admissible. Evidence is relevant if there is a particular connection 
between it and the fact it is offered to prove or disprove. This connec-
tion does not have to be so strong that a single item of evidence has any 
tendency to make a fact more or less probable.102 It is sufficient if the pi-
ece of evidence amounts to a link in a chain of information offered as 
proof. Data gathered as a result of monitoring a human driver’s face or 
the fact that a drowsiness alert was activated could be relevant evidence, 
but so could an overall assessment of a driver’s conduct by a driving as-
sistant should it make a material fact more or less probable than if it 
were excluded. 
There are many rules that can lead to the exclusion of potentially rel-
evant evidence, including Rule 403, which authorizes judges to balance 
the probative value of an item of evidence against the potential harm 
resulting from its admission. The same rule states that relevant evi-
dence should be excluded where its probative value is outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion to the trier of fact, or where it 
is deemed to be wasting time or cumulative in nature. Doubt surround-
ing the source of a piece of evidence can also lead to the evidence being 
viewed as less credible.103 Therefore, if a judge determines that the rea-
son for which a drowsiness detection system in a car was triggered is not 
of sufficient probative value to determine whether or not the driver was 
sleepy, he or she will exclude the evidence. Although courts tend to 
interpret Rule 403 narrowly,104 a great deal depends on the judge’s rea-
soning, particularly with respect to whether or not the evidence would 
confuse or mislead a jury.105 This issue is especially pertinent to the 
black box problem inherent in machine-generated data given the high 
degree of technicality and limited means of explaining it.106 
In addition to the requirement that evidence be relevant, it must also 
be reliable. For example, polygraph evidence lacks reliability and, as a 
result, is generally banned from federal courtrooms in America.107 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit generally bars them and the 
U.S. Attorneys’ Manual for prosecutors suggests that Assistant U.S. Attorneys should oppose their 
In 
102. See SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & RACHEL E. BARKOW, CRIMINAL LAW AND 
ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 25–26 (10th ed. 2017). 
103. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence? 41 VAND. L. REV. 879, 
881–86 (1988) (describing additional information about Rule 403). 
104. Id. at 884, 886–89. 
105. John Nawara, Machine Learning: Face Recognition Technology Evidence in Criminal Trials, 49 
U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 601, 607 (2010). 
106. See supra Part II.C.2.a. 
107. 
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introduction as unreliable. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL: CRIMINAL 
RESOURCE MANUAL § 262, https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-262- 
polygraphs-introduction-trial.  
the words of Justice Thomas in Scheffer, “there is simply no consensus 
that polygraph evidence is reliable[.]”108 However, some federal appel-
late courts have abandoned this per se exclusionary rule and have left 
the decision of admission or exclusion to the discretion of district 
courts under Daubert,109 thereby granting more leeway with regard to 
the relevance and reliability of new technologies in the future.110 It may 
be the case that judges’ attitudes will continue to change as the AI tech-
nology becomes increasingly useful and more ubiquitous. 
Given the reticence of European courts to use lie detectors, one 
might doubt a similar scenario would come to fruition anytime soon. In 
1998, the highest German Court (Bundesgerichtshof) deemed poly-
graph evidence as “a completely unsuitable means of proof” without 
any probative value.111 It further held that the polygraph’s measure-
ment of bodily functions, specifically the registration and assessment of 
data, lacks sufficient scientific methodology to be considered reliable 
evidence.112 
Despite the treatment of polygraph evidence by courts around the 
world, technology continues to develop and the use of processes such 
as AI-driven Facial Recognition Technology and other tools that use 
machines to monitor and evaluate human behavior have increased. As 
such, criminal courts may begin to have more difficulty arguing that 
machine-generated evidence is not adequately equipped to assess the 
mental state of a person or predict human action. With respect to 
drowsiness detection systems, evidence has shown that they predict  
108. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998). To this day, the scientific community 
worldwide remains extremely polarized regarding the reliability of polygraph techniques. See, e.g., 
Jacqueline Elton, The Polygraph in the English Courts: A Creeping Inevitability or a Step too Far? 81 
J. CRIM. L. 66, 68–74 (2017); see also United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1997) (for U.S. examples). At least one 
federal appellate court has recently reaffirmed its per se ban. See United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 
192, 197 (4th Cir. 1997). The Second Circuit recently noted that it has “not decided whether 
polygraphy has reached a sufficient state of reliability to be admissible.” United States v. Messina, 
131 F.3d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 1997). 
109. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. 
Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44 JURIMETRICS 351 (2004) (explaining Daubert in detail). 
110. Nawara, supra note 105, at 605. 
111. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 17, 1998, 1 StR 1998, 156/98 
(Ger.). 
112. Id. at 44–74. 
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momentary episodes of somnolence quite well,113 and it is for this rea-
son that such technology will become part of EU vehicle safety meas-
ures. It may therefore be the case that machine evidence will enter the 
evidentiary life cycle in Europe in the not-too-distant future.114 
3. Use of Written Reports to Introduce Machine Evidence 
If machine evidence was determined to be sufficiently reliable, could 
it then be presented at trial in the form of written reports submitted by 
experts (as opposed to introduction by oral testimony)? Or would such 
reports be excluded because a finding by a machine was offered as 
truth of the matter asserted, thereby triggering confrontation rights, 
including the testimonial safeguards of impeachment and hearsay 
rules? In Germany such reports would, in principle, be acceptable as 
long as both parties have trust in the court-appointed expert and have 
full access to the report via the shared case file. In the United States, 
however, the presentation of such reports would likely meet consider-
able resistance in light of a long tradition of an in-court evaluation of 
evidentiary credibility and a broad interpretation of what constitutes 
“testimony.” 
a. Germany 
In Germany, it is normal operating procedure in a criminal trial for 
the prosecution to include a lab report in the case file early in the pro-
ceedings. Such a document would state that an expert was appointed 
by the prosecution service or the bench to evaluate the merits of the 
case and would include the tests administered and subsequent findings 
by the expert. The lab report generally will not, however, reveal details 
about a digital measuring device like a radar gun. As long as the device 
has been certified to be used as an evidentiary tool, the measured raw 
data and the details of the digital design will typically not be disclosed 
to the defendant. For example, a report in a case where a drowsiness 
detection system’s data is offered as evidence could include things like 
if and when a driver was alerted that they were too tired to drive and 
any changes in the intensity of the alert over time as calculated by the 
expert. As things stand today, the report would not include details like 
the software design, methods used in machine learning, or the 
machine training data. 
113. Vural et al., supra note 9 (claiming that their system predicted crashes related to 
sleepiness during a driving computer game with 96% accuracy). 
114. Kaestle, supra note 72, at 53 (describing such a cycle with regard to DNA evidence). 
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The trier of fact (the bench in this case) may accept these types of 
reports as expert evidence asserting as fact that, for instance, the drowsi-
ness detections system’s coffee cup-signal was illuminated, but also as 
corroborative evidence that the driver was tired and did not stop for a 
break, which could amount to a failure to exercise due care in the cir-
cumstances or may even reach the point of recklessness. The bench, as 
the natural driver of fact-finding in an inquisitorial proceeding, may 
also choose to appoint another expert to provide a new report or sum-
mon further experts to assess the machine’s findings in the oral hear-
ing.115 Presently, it is unclear how much tinkering or evaluation of an 
AI-driven device would be allowed or deemed necessary to establish 
“the truth.” It is, however, clear that a court-appointed expert has suffi-
cient time and, at least theoretically, powerful means to seize data 
through the help of the prosecutor or the bench that appointed her or 
him. 
During the investigation phase, a defendant can informally offer 
expert evidence to support his or her claim(s) by giving the lead prose-
cutor a report from an expert. This is, of course, dependent upon the 
defendant having the financial resources to hire an expert as well as 
access to the necessary case information.116 If such a report was gener-
ated, it would be added to the case file by the prosecution and the 
defense would then be contributing their own witness’s opinion. All 
documents in the case file then become part of the court’s truth-seek-
ing mission and the file is accessible to all parties before the case goes 
to trial.117 
The inquisitorial justice process is built upon the general assumption 
that the bench, as professionals, are impartial at the outset of every case 
and are sufficiently experienced to identify unreliable evidence. With 
regard to forensic evidence, a great deal of trust is placed in govern-
mental institutions that work closely with the prosecution, who is 
obliged to look for both incriminating and exonerating evidence.118 
Not without good reason, Mirjan Damasˇka has argued that fact-finding 
by the bench and the traditionally episodic and placid approach on the 
European continent is likely the primary reason for an absence of clear 
evidentiary rules, and it seems more than likely that this problem will  
115. StPO § 214. 
116. Id. § 222. 
117. Id. § 261. 
118. Id. § 256, para. 1; Matthias Kru¨ger, Commentary StPO § 256, in MU¨NCHENER KOMMENTAR 
ZUR STRAFPROZEßORDNUNG BD.2: §§ 151–332 (Kudlich et al. eds., 2016) (Ger.). 
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persist in the future.119 However, the generous amount of time allowed 
to vet experts outside the courtroom is a particularly important aspect 
of the inquisitorial system and one could also argue that the lack of 
clear evidentiary rules provides leeway for a more flexible approach. 
Nevertheless, such notions of the open-minded bench and impartial 
law-enforcement clearly are idealistic and place a significant amount of 
faith in the state. A supposed safety net is traditionally created through 
a review of the establishment of facts by appellate courts.120 As such, in 
practice, benches administer proceedings with the possibility of appel-
late review in the back of their minds, which makes the evidentiary 
process predictable despite a lack of strict evidentiary rules. The cor-
responding obligation for the bench to explain the reasoning 
behind the evaluation of evidence in a judgment can lead to individ-
ual and comprehensive explanations that render the process trans-
parent, but may also result in cookie-cutter decisions that will hold 
up on appeal but do not provide much consideration for the specif-
ics of a particular case.121 
Wolfgang Frisch, Beweiswu¨rdigung und richterliche U¨berzeugung, 10 ZEITSCHRIFT FU¨R 
INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK 707, 711–13 (2016) (Ger.), http://www.zis-online.com/ 
dat/artikel/2016_10_1056.pdf  
The path machine evidence will take in this system is somewhat diffi-
cult to foresee given the array of options for obtaining evidence during 
the investigatory phases. Much will depend on the prosecution services 
who set the blueprint for fact-finding very early on via the case file, as 
well as on the benches that eventually decide how much vetting a piece 
of evidence requires before it can be deemed reliable in the establish-
ment of the truth. It is interesting to note that over the last few years 
certified digital evidentiary tools have sparked a heated debate around 
the scope of access to the file or, more generally, the idea of “knowl-
edge parity.”122 As things stand today, the prosecution or the bench sim-
ply adds the expert’s report to the file, which is accessible by the 
defense, but does not include detailed information about how the digi-
tal tool works, nor does it provide the defense with any means of collect-
ing or accessing such information. This shortfall has recently been  
119. Damasˇka, supra note 14, at 428–29. 
120. Andreas Mosbacher, Das Ideal richterlicher Wahrheitsfindung und die Betru¨bnisse des wirklichen 
Lebens: Richterliche Schuldfeststellung und die Gefahr des Fehlurteils, 9 FORENSISCHE PSYCHIATRIE, 
PSYCHOLOGIE, KRIMINOLOGIE 82, 86 (2015) (Ger.). 
121. 
 
122. Rudolf Wendt, Das Recht auf Offenlegung der Messunterlagen im Bussgeldverfahren 30 
NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FU¨R VERKEHRSRECHT, 441, 442–43 (2018) (Ger.) 
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scrutinized in the case law of the Higher Regional Courts,123 but a deci-
sion by the Federal Court on the topic has yet to be made. Nevertheless, 
it seems likely that in the future machine evidence will be introduced 
by experts, whether in written reports or orally in more detail than 
today. 
b. United States 
In the United States, a report documenting the findings from an 
expert who is not present in court would meet a great deal more resist-
ance from the defense than it would in Continental Europe.124 That 
said, under the current evidentiary regime, courts often rely on legal 
memoranda and scientific documents rather than oral hearings when 
examining witnesses in the courtroom.125 Should this practice also gov-
ern machine evidence presented in court? Scholars opposed to this de-
velopment have gone into great detail explaining how flaws in design 
(black box problems) and other human/machine errors can lead to 
unreliable fact-finding when using machine evidence. They liken this 
to the hearsay dangers hidden in human assertions and thus oppose a 
documentary evidence approach.126 
If and when the hearsay rule should apply to reports127 or whether 
they (and other documentary evidence) should be admitted as an asser-
tion of fact is the subject of a controversial debate and case law has yet 
to provide any clarity.128 
See Christopher B. Mueller, Laird C. Kirkpatrick, & Liesa L. Richter, EVIDENCE UNDER THE 
RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 313–19 (9th ed. 2019); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of 
Laboratory Reports in Criminal Trials: The Reliability of Scientific Proof, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (1988); see 
also Lyle Denniston, The Confrontation Clause –– Again, and Again, SCOTUS BLOG (May. 9, 
2014, 2:24 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2014/05/the-confrontation-clause-again-and- 
again/ (last visited January 26, 2020). 
This topic is addressed below as part of the 
123. Oberlandesgericht [OLG] Bamberg, June 13, 2018, 3 Ss Owi 626/18 (Ger.). But see 
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] Karlsruhe July 16, 2019, 1 Rb10 Ss 291/19 (Ger.), Verfas- 
sungsgerichtshof [VERFGH] Saarbru¨cken Apr. 27, 2018, Lv 1/18; Kammergericht [KG] April 2, 
2019, 3 Ws [B] 97/19 – 122 Ss 43/19 (Ger.) (granting access to measurement data based on Art. 6 
of the European Human Rights Convention). 
124. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 
564 U.S. 647 (2011); Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012); see also Celentino, supra note 45. 
125. See, e.g., Hayes v. State, 660 So. 2d 257, 262–64 (Fla. 1995); United States v. Porter, 618 
A.2d 629, 635 (D.C. 1992); United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ind. 2000); 
People v. Palmer, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466, 472 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). 
126. Roth, supra note 3, at 1989–99; Chessman, supra note 5, at 209. 
127. See generally Madeline Smedley, Note, Hearsay in the Modern Age: Balancing Practicality and 
Reliability by Amending Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 207 (2019), for 
additional details about Federal Rule of Evidence 802. 
128. 
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discussion of witness evidence (see C.II.3.). Notably, scholars have put 
forward the argument that where machine evidence is concerned, it 
may prove more useful to replace a strict requirement for oral hearings 
with alternative solutions that take into account the complexity of thor-
oughly testing intelligent machines.129 This idea may gain traction 
given that courts and legislatures today tend to be more open to experi-
menting with evaluations and testimony outside the courtroom.130 
From a comparative perspective, where machine evidence could be 
introduced as documentary evidence (e.g., a lab report under an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule), its trustworthiness could be assessed through 
disclosure. In other words, the defense would have the right to know 
what law enforcement knows about the reliability of the evidence. The 
out-of-court machine/human assertion admitted under a hearsay 
exception, could be tested by the defense by arguing that the machine 
was a declarant. The defense could then use any of the “declarant’s” 
prior (inconsistent) statements to impeach its credibility,131 including 
citing the validity testing (or lack thereof) of a drowsiness detection 
system. 
In the case of machine evidence generated by consumer products, it 
is questionable whether disclosure tools are sufficient to scrutinize its 
reliability. First, the defense’s access to evidence during disclosure is 
not a particularly powerful right132 compared to discovery rules in civil 
cases.133 Furthermore, remedies provided by case law designed to 
strengthen disclosure rules fall short of what is needed in the specific 
situation of machine evidence that is a byproduct of a consumer prod-
uct, not to mention that the relevant data is stored with private 
129. See Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure in Algorithmic 
Enforcement, 69 FLA. L. REV. 181, 185 (2017). 
130. Roth, supra note 3, at 2028 (using the phrase “meaningful access to machine evidence”). 
131. Roth, supra note 3, at 2033. 
132. See Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes, 79 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1091, 1094, 1103 (2014). 
133. Traditionally this imbalance has been justified by privileges and constitutional 
protections granted to a criminal defendant that theoretically work to his or her advantage, 
including the right to remain silent or the right to not be required to disclose a defense strategy. 
See United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (“Under our criminal procedure the 
accused has every advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not 
disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is immune from question or comment on his 
silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the 
twelve. Why in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence against him to pick over at 
his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been able to see.”). However, given 
the practicality of how these rights work (or don’t), they hardly outweigh the prosecutorial 
advantage in evidentiary discovery. 
AI IN THE COURTROOM 
2020] 229 
stakeholders.134 Primarily based on the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Brady v. Maryland135 obligates the prosecution 
to provide the defense with any material evidence136 that would be rea-
sonably likely to change the outcome of the trial.137 Accordingly, in 
recent years, the forensic evidence held by the prosecution made avail-
able to the defense has been considerably expanded.138 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL 9.5.001(F) (2018), https://www.justice.gov/jm/ 
title-9-criminal.  
Despite this obligation, in cases of incriminating machine evidence 
generated by consumer products, the prosecution will often not be in 
possession of material that would be likely to undermine the court’s 
confidence in data generated by an automobile’s driving assistant. The 
source code, machine training data, and algorithms used for drowsi-
ness detection systems will typically be in the possession of the car man-
ufacturer, who may refuse to produce them by claiming trade secret 
privileges.139 Therefore, defendants seeking usable material to chal-
lenge such data cannot rely solely on what is already in the possession 
of the prosecution. This is different from the situation where a defend-
ant is seeking disclosure of information from digital tools designed for 
forensic use (like a breathalyzer or DNA sampling) as the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure mandate the disclosure of such information.140 
Despite this rule, courts have been reluctant to grant discovery of any 
“underlying documentation” used in preparation of a final report, and 
specifically any results from digital tools used in forensic settings.141 
Similar issues are likely to arise with AI’s use of big data to make 
134. See Kerr, supra note 47, at 309–10 (providing information on the general issue of 
cybercrime). 
135. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
136. Id. Evidence is deemed “material” if the prosecutor’s failure to produce it would 
undermine the court’s confidence in the outcome of the proceedings. Kenneth M. Miller, Nixon 
May Have Been Wrong, but it Is Definitely Misunderstood (or, a Federal Criminal Defendant’s Pretrial 
Subpoenas Duces Tecum Properly Reaches Potentially Admissible Evidence), 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 319, 
324 (2015). 
137. See Miller, supra note 136, 323-–26 (for additional information). 
138.  
139. See Wexler, supra note 78; Ram, supra note 78, at 701–4. 
140. See Mellon, supra note 63, at 1113–14 (arguing that defendants have a right to the source 
code of digital tools in forensic settings when the term “scientific report” is interpreted to include 
any information relied upon, either explicitly or implicitly, in creating a final expert report, 
although most jurisdictions have not embraced this interpretation). 
141. See United States v. Iglesias, 881 F.2d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1989) (denying discovery of a 
chemist’s log notes); Roberts v. State, 396 S.E.2d 81, 81 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (denying discovery of 
an expert’s notes, work product, recordation of data, internal documents, or graphs); State v. 
Parnell 883 N.W.2d 652, 667 (Neb. 2016) (disclosure of a cellular analyst’s opinion by the State 
one week before trial did not violate due process). 
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predictions. It also remains to be seen how courts will react when faced 
with data generated by consumer products offered as evidence.142 
Should a defendant seek to challenge the accuracy of a statement 
from an “intelligent machine,” like a drowsiness detection system, he or 
she might need to access the source code to understand how it was pro-
grammed. He or she may also want access to the machine learning algo-
rithms to examine other aspects such as any trade-offs that were made 
to further efficiency and effectiveness in the AI-driven process.143 It is 
against this backdrop that scholars are demanding a “digital Brady” 
rule, or discovery regarding the procedures used to produce a particu-
lar set of data, as well as information about their reliability.144 While the 
seriousness of this call for action is uncontested, the reality is that most 
criminal proceedings end in a plea (typically with defendants not 
entirely understanding the probative value of the machine evidence 
against them),145 and therefore the right to impeach a witness.146 The 
question of resources is also frequently a determinative factor. 
Therefore, even with a digital Brady disclosure rule in place, it would 
only be helpful where a defendant could assert his or her right to 
impeach a witness, even after a plea,147 and had the access and resour-
ces to retain their own expert who could critically evaluate the evidence 
and ask appropriate questions.148 This raises numerous concerns about 
the practicality of the means currently available for indigent defendants 
to challenge evidence.149 
142. A new stand on trade secret privileges would need to be made. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 
78. 
143. See Berman, supra note 80, at 1325. 
144. Garrett, supra note 5, at 211–12; see Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored 
Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014); Tom Baker & Benedict G.C. 
Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice Across the Financial Services Industry, 103 IOWA L. REV. 713 (2018). 
145. Roth, supra note 3, at 2033. 
146. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (discussing the government’s 
obligations to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement); see 
also Colin Miller, The Right to Evidence of Innocence Before Pleading Guilty, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 271, 
293–299 (2019) (arguing that under the Due Process Clause a defendant is entitled to evidence of 
his or her innocence prior to plea bargaining). 
147. See generally Miller, supra note 146, at 293–99, 320–21. 
148. Murphy, supra note 5, at 749. 
149. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Duty to Investigate and the Availability of Expert Witnesses, 86 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1709, 1715–20 (2018). 
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4. Machine Evidence and the Need for Contextualization and 
Confrontation 
Legal safeguards in place in both Germany (e.g., access to the case 
file, the principle of immediacy, witness attendance obligations, and 
rights of confrontation) and the United States (e.g., the right to con-
front and impeach a witness, the rule against hearsay) fall short of assur-
ing valid fact-finding where machine evidence is offered as truth of the 
matter asserted because both systems lack adequate means to “con-
front” such evidence in court, thoroughly vet it, and provide context to 
the trier of fact. 
If one assumes that machine evidence introduced by a written report 
would qualify as pre-recorded testimony offered as truth of the matter 
asserted, the questions arising thereafter are fundamentally different. 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, a 
statement that is considered testimonial in nature may not be intro-
duced at trial against an accused unless he or she has had an opportu-
nity to cross-examine the person who made the statement and that 
person is unavailable to testify at trial.150 However, if a statement is not 
regarded as testimonial, the Confrontation Clause poses little, if any ob-
stacle, to its admission. 
The meaning of the word “testimonial,” or rather, the type of witness 
that will trigger the Confrontation Clause, has been the subject of vigor-
ous debates.151 In Europe, there has been some litigation before the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) with regard to the right to 
confrontation under Article 6(3)(d) of the European Convention on 
Human rights (ECHR).152 The prevailing doctrine in the United States 
requires the exclusion of statements by witnesses for the prosecution 
where the witness is not available to testify at trial unless the defense 
had a prior chance to challenge such statements by means of cross-ex-
amination.153 The European doctrine is much more vague as the 
ECtHR currently draws upon a three-step analysis first set out in Al- 
Khawaja & Tahery v. U.K.154
Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. U.K., Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 26766/05 & 22228/06, 37 (2011), 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-108072%22]}. Cf. Jackson & Summers, 
supra note 94, at 93–95, 338–41. 
: (1) whether a good reason exists for the ab-
sence of a witness at trial; (2) whether the conviction is solely or 
150. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 36 (2004). 
151. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of Testimonial, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 
241, 242 (2005). 
152. See Vuille, supra note 100, for references to applicable case law. 
153. See Denniston, supra note 128, for a detailed discussion. 
154. 
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
232 [Vol. 51 
decisively based on the statement of the absent witness; and (3) whether 
sufficient counterbalancing factors exist “to compensate for the handi-
caps caused to the defen[s]e as a result of the admission of the untested 
evidence and to ensure that the trial, judged as a whole, was fair.”155 The 
ECtHR applied this test in a more recent case involving Germany, 
emphasizing the trial court’s obligation to “approach untested evidence 
of an absent witness with caution” and look for corroborating evi-
dence,156 
Schatschaschwili v. Ger., Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 9154/10, 30–31 (2015), https://hudoc. 
echr.coe.int/eng.  
illustrating the unpredictability of this line of case law.157 
While strict interpretation of the U.S. right may too be waning in 
practice,158 scholars maintain that constitutional protections require 
that a witness take an oath and be confronted by the accused in person 
while maintaining their assertions under cross-examination.159 The 
underlying rationale of preventing false accusations and optimizing the 
trier of fact’s chance to accurately evaluate the credibility of a statement 
also typically necessitates that the declarant be present in court so his 
or her demeanor can be taken into account. 
This concept appears meaningless in the context of machine evi-
dence because it is impossible for it to undergo a similar vetting process 
in court. It also does not seem feasible to replace AI-driven devices with 
one or more of the individuals who created it. This is not just because 
the formation and operation of AI typically involve a number of individ-
uals, none of whom would be able to fully explain a robot’s action 
where specific machine learning programming was used.160 When vet-
ting human testimony, we want to know whether certain factors were 
perceived and considered and how they led the human to a particular 
conclusion. Artificial Intelligence cannot answer these questions with 
the technology available today. Although much work has gone into 
“explainable AI,” or the development of machine learning models that 
are interpretable by humans, as well as the creation of self-explaining 
155. See Al-Khawaja & Tahery v. U.K., supra note 154, at 37. 
156.  
157. See Deborah Paruch, Testimonial Statements, Reliability, and the Sole or Decisive Evidence Rule: A 
Comparative Look at the Right of Confrontation in the United States, Canada, and Europe, 67 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 136–137, 147–48 (2018). 
158. Strict interpretation of the right was not without initial controversy, as described by 
Justice Rehnquist, “while I agree that the Framers were mainly concerned about sworn affidavits 
and depositions, it does not follow that they were similarly concerned about the Court’s broader 
category of testimonial statements . . . ” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 71 (2004) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
159. Celentino, supra note 45, at 1331. 
160. See Chessman, supra note 5, at 179. 
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AI, meaningful advances in explainable decision-making have been mini-
mal.161 Adequate vetting of AI seems difficult to achieve but will remain a 
goal given the fact that certain information can be obtained solely from 
its system. Researchers have continued to work on teaching AI how to 
make itself more understandable and recently scientists from both private 
and academic sectors have had some success in teaching image recogni-
tion software to show evidence it relied upon in reaching its decision.162 
Cf. Dong Huk Park, et al., Multimodal Explanations: Justifying Decisions and Pointing to the 
Evidence, Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (June 18–22, 2018), https:// 
arxiv.org/pdf/1802.08129.pdf.  
Presently, we need the functional equivalent of a means to evaluate 
AI statements, which would not only involve explanations from human 
witnesses, but also provide an account of the input, how the data was 
processed, and the final assessment directly from the machine rather 
than expert interpretation (just as we would not allow an expert to 
mediate a human witness’s testimony). 
a. Germany 
The question of whether or not conclusions by AI-driven devices can 
be evaluated for accuracy similar to human witnesses initially appears to 
be a moot point under German law as it does not provide for a genuine 
confrontation of human witnesses and Germany does not have an 
adversarial-like hearsay rule163 or a substantial cross-examination pro-
cess.164 This is primarily because it is not a jury comprised of laypeople 
(who presumably require more context) that is assessing the credibility 
of a source, but rather benches made up of people with trial experience 
and knowledge of the case file. The German criminal justice system 
does, however, acknowledge its specific risks, among them a trial based 
upon a previously prepared case file. It aims to prevent the court’s 
truth-finding mission from being predetermined by the prosecutor’s 
investigation with a commitment to the so-called principle of immedi-
acy: this principle states that the court shall base its judgement only on 
what has been said and done at the public trial.165 The inquisitorial 
161. See Johannes Fa¨hndrich, Sebastian Ahrndt, & Sahin Albayrak, Towards Self-Explaining 
Agents, in TRENDS IN PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF AGENTS AND MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS: 11TH INT’L 
CONF. ON PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF AGENTS AND MULTI-AGENT SYS. 147–150 (Javier Bajo Pe´rez et 
al. eds., 2013) (for the general idea of a self-explaining system). 
162. 
 
163. See generally MICHAEL BOHLANDER, PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 145–57 
(2012). 
164. The code does include an inquisitorial version of cross-examination, although in practice 
it is not used in any meaningful way. StPO § 239. 
165. Cf. id.§ 244, 250, 261. 
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nature of the process allows for information that would be considered 
hearsay in a common law system to be admitted.166 Unwavering trust in 
professional judges’ fact-finding capabilities and insight into human 
nature, as well as their purported impartiality, brought about statutory 
provisions conferring on the bench the power to provide only as much 
context as they see fit to witness or expert testimony.167 
As the trier of fact, the bench is tasked with hearing all relevant evi-
dence and assessing it freely (without bias) to determine its probative 
value.168 An initial comparative look at German criminal procedure 
would reveal that it lacks credibility testing similar to that of adversarial 
jurisdictions.169 However, the defense’s right to question incriminating 
witnesses has been notably enhanced through the ECtHR’s case law 
around confrontation rights found in Article 6 of the ECHR.170 
Notably, reference to the fair trial rights established under this provi-
sion appear to have gained importance with regard to machine evi-
dence. In recent cases, these human rights seem to have served as a sort 
of secondary remedy for a defendant requesting knowledge parity 
where fact-finding is based on a digital evidentiary tool like a radar 
gun.171 It reveals a gap in adequate remedies under traditional German 
law where a case file lacks relevant information and the prosecution or 
the bench are unwilling to vest the defense with the means to properly 
rebut a prosecutorial claim.172 
The inquisitorial tradition’s allowance of hearsay evidence in pro-
ceedings is one of several fundamental differences from the adversarial  
166. THOMAS WEIGEND, Defense Rights in European Legal Systems under the Influence of the European 
Court of Human Rights, in The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Process 165–188 (Darryl K. Brown, 
Jenia L. Turner & Bettina Weisser eds., 2019). 
167. StPO §244 ¶ 2 (The presiding judge is primarily responsible for deciding what evidence 
will be presented at the trial. The prosecution as well as the defense may propose additional 
pieces of evidence, but the court decides on the relevance and admissibility of the proposed 
evidence.). 
168. Damasˇka, supra note 14, at 446. 
169. Some defense lawyers have begun to point out the flaws of the inquisitorial system and 
test the boundaries of the tools available to them. See, e.g., Ralf Neuhaus, Kriminaltechnik fu¨r den 
Strafverteidiger – Eine Einfu¨hrung in die Grundlagen, 24 STRAFVERTEIDIGER-FORUM 393 (2006) (Ger.). 
170. Weigand, supra note 166, at 183. 
171. Wendt, supra note 122; Cierniak & Niehaus, supra note 98; see also Oberlandesgericht 
[OLG] Karlsruhe July 16, 2019, 1 Rb10 Ss 291/19 (Ger.); Verfassungsgerichtshof [VerfGH] 
Saarbru¨cken, Apr. 27, 2018, Lv 1/18; Kammergericht [KG], April 2, 2019, 3 Ws [B] 97/19 – 122 Ss 
43/19 (Ger.). 
172. Cf. Benjamin Krenberger, Anmerkung zu Verfassungsgerichtshof (VerfGH) Saarbru¨cken, 
Apr. 27, 2018 Lv 1/18, 30 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FU¨R VERKEHRSRECHT 282–83 (2018) (Ger.). 
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model.173 At first glance, one might assume that the German system 
stands in stark contrast to the United States’ insistence on a strict appli-
cation of the hearsay rule.174 However, a closer comparison of German 
and U.S. federal law would reveal some commonalities between the two 
systems. For instance, both take a similar approach with reports detail-
ing laboratory findings at trial, including who must be called to the 
stand to discuss the conclusions.175 
In Germany, mechanisms to account for trustworthiness in fact- 
finding might not be as visible as in adversarial jurisdictions. Like 
other inquisitorial systems, it relies heavily upon the various parties 
involved in a case to add to contribute to the establishment of facts 
throughout the investigation. This culminates in the bench sum-
moning relevant witnesses to the oral hearing prior to the final fact- 
finding, always keeping in mind the principle of immediacy.176 
This principle of immediacy is the most important safeguard in place 
in the German system and aims to achieve direct contact between the 
trier of fact and the source of information. Typically, the result would 
be that all witnesses must appear in court or, to quote from German 
procedural law, “[i]f the proof of a fact is based on the observation of a 
person, such person shall be examined at the main hearing. The exami-
nation shall not be replaced by reading out the record of a previous ex-
amination or reading out a written statement.”177 A problem arises in 
the case of digital evidentiary devices because their analysis is done out-
side the courtroom and behind the “closed doors” of the device. 
Due to legal reforms and the significant degree of trust placed in the 
bench, an evaluation of the credibility of witness statements is left to 
the court. Witnesses are not assigned to a “side” (prosecution or 
defense), but instead are part of the court’s overall truth-seeking 
mission.178 The right of the prosecution and the defense to question 
witnesses is exercised in a manner less formal than the in-person cross- 
examination format of adversarial systems. Given this type of structure, 
calling for the functional equivalent of witness examination of a robot, 
173. Strictly speaking, there is no admissibility test in a German criminal proceeding. 
174. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004). 
175. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 25, 2011, 2 StR, 2011, 585/10 
(Ger.); Kathleen Schnoor, BEURTEILUNG DER SCHULDFA¨HIGKEIT – EINE EMPIRISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG 
ZUM UMGANG DER JUSTIZ MIT SACHVERSTA¨NDIGEN (2009) (Ger.). 
176. Although exceptions to the general rules, the prosecution and defense may bring their 
own witnesses to trial or ask the bench to summon a witness. See StPO § 244. 
177. Id. § 250. 
178. Namely, the “opinion rule,” precluding conclusory factual statements by lay witnesses, or 
the “best evidence rule,” requiring original documentation to prove the contents of a writing. 
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as a provider of quasi-testimonial statements, does not seem unreason-
able in the German system. 
That said, it is not clear how the German legal community would 
respond to such an idea, particularly given that over time the shield of 
immediacy has become porous. Although procedural law has generally 
been built upon the traditional dictum that a court must base its judge-
ment solely on what is said or done during a public trial, German law 
today provides for a number of exceptions where depositions of absent 
witnesses can be admitted as evidence and, as a result, the original best 
evidence rule has lost ground.179 Additionally, written records docu-
menting the previous examination of witnesses, experts, or even a co- 
defendant can replace their oral examination where “illness, infirmity, 
or other insurmountable impediments” prevent their appearance at 
the main hearing “for a long or indefinite period,” or where “the public 
prosecutor, defense counsel, and the accused agree to the reading 
out.”180 
This development poses both risks and potential solutions with 
regard to machine evidence. On the one hand, it provides space to 
thoroughly test AI-driven devices outside the courtroom, thereby pro-
viding relevant documentation for the trier of fact, and thus establish-
ing the foundation for the assessment of credibility. On the other 
hand, it carries the risk that machine evidence will not be treated as tes-
timonial evidence and could eventually enter the fact-finding domain 
without sufficient vetting. If we accept that AI conveys a message of its 
own through its evaluation of a human user’s conduct, we would want 
to know the type of input perceived and how it led to a particular con-
clusion, similar to what would we would ask of a human witness on the 
stand. Therefore, the question remains as to how AI can be adequately 
evaluated to ensure trustworthiness. 
b. United States 
If federal courts regard machine evidence as a type of pre-recorded 
witness statement required to be cross-examined to ascertain the 
179. Damasˇka, supra note 14, at 425, 448 n.64 (drawing a line from Carl Mittermaier to English 
evidentiary law); see also Eser et al., AE-Beweisaufnahme, GA 2014, 1, 13 ff.; Thomas Weigend, Das 
Konfrontationsrecht des Angeklagten – wesentliches Element eines fairen Verfahrens oder Fremdko¨rper im 
deutschen Strafprozess?, in GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT IN INTERNATIONALER DIMENSION: 
FESTSCHRIFT FU¨R JU¨RGEN WOLTER ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG AM 7. SEPTEMBER 2013, 1145 (Mark A. 
Zo¨ller et al. eds., 2013) (Ger.). 
180. StPO § 251, para. 2. 
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veracity of its assertion, who would be called to the stand? The 
machine? The humans behind the machine? 
Interestingly enough, this question has resulted in a fierce debate 
among U.S. legal scholars,181 but it also hints at a crossroads between 
adversarial and inquisitorial systems. The hearsay exclusion is integral 
to the collective memory of the U.S. adversarial system. In Crawford, 
Justice Scalia explains why testimony before a magistrate is generally 
insufficient in a U.S. court despite being adequate in civil law jurisdic-
tions.182 While witness and expert depositions can be evaluated by both 
parties and the bench in the inquisitorial fact-finding process, such in-
formation remains inadmissible in adversarial proceedings unless they 
fall under an exception. This poses a problem where the reliability and 
credibility of evidence is based on complex technology that must be 
understood, tested, and adequately explained to the trier of fact. It is 
for this reason that several scholars have argued that the existing format 
of credibility testing should be broadened or that a similar deposition- 
style credibility test should be created for machine evidence.183 
Christian Chessmann has put forward the idea of using impeach-
ment techniques to bring the humans that created the relevant 
machine or software into the courtroom rather than trying to find 
equivalent means of putting a robot on the witness stand.184 While a 
reasonable idea, it comes with its own problems for courts.185 Given 
that cross-examining a witness often involves questioning of their credi-
bility, a large number of people would have to be called into court in 
order to challenge data generated by an AI-driven device like an auto-
mated car because, at least in this case, it is dependent on a number of 
“driving assistants,” each of which has its own source code and 
machine-learning standardization data.186 
181. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 3, at 2046; Friedman, supra note 151, at 256–59. 
182. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–56 (2004); see also People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 
494 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting) (“[A]s a result of ever more powerful technologies, our justice 
system has increasingly relied on ex parte computerized determinations of critical facts in 
criminal proceedings—determinations once made by human beings. A crime lab’s reliance on 
gas chromatography may be a marked improvement over less accurate or more subjective 
methods of determining blood-alcohol levels. The allure of such technology is its infallibility, its 
precision, its incorruptibility. But I wonder if that allure should prompt us to remain alert to 
constitutional concerns, lest we gradually recreate through machines instead of magistrates the 
civil law mode of ex parte production of evidence that constituted the ‘principal evil at which the 
Confrontation Clause was directed.’”) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.). 
183. Roth, supra note 30, at 1283–85, 1300–01. 
184. Chessman, supra note 5, at 220 n. 310. 
185. Id. 
186. Roth, supra note 30, at 1278. 
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As an early scholar in the field, Andrea Roth proposed a new path, 
arguing that the constant focus on hearsay, which by definition refers 
only to out-of-court statements by people, might be misleading in the dig-
ital age.187 In a detailed analysis of the many potential flaws of intelli-
gent machines, she encourages a new format for what would be the 
equivalent of impeaching a non-human entity. It would require diverg-
ing from typical courtroom testing but could potentially apply to both 
adversarial and inquisitorial systems. 
Instead of an oral cross-examination of the programmer responsible 
for designing specific software, the machine’s overall potential for 
faulty design and data production would be probed prior to trial by giv-
ing both sides access to certain information. Ideally, this would include 
the source code, standardization data, and training data (respecting 
trade secrets where applicable), as well as the possibility to experiment 
with the machine and analyze the algorithmic system.188 Such testing of 
the machine could amount to an out-of-court “confrontation,” which 
would need to be subsequently introduced to the court by an expert 
who participated in the evaluation. 
5. Machine Evidence’s Need for Translation Through 
Expert Testimony 
Machine evidence and expert testimony are inextricably linked due 
to the fact that AI-generated data must be explained. In the German 
system, the bench, as the factfinder, typically appoints an expert when 
it feels it lacks the requisite expertise, but provides few tools for the 
defense to challenge court-appointed expert evidence. The U.S. sys-
tem, with its partisan experts and one-sided presentations, risks the pos-
sibility that conclusions offered by forensic experts go beyond the 
boundaries of general scientific knowledge into the realm of mislead-
ing the trier of fact. This is particularly risky when indigent defendants 
are without the resources to hire respected and experienced experts. 
As mentioned already, experts are crucial to the use of machine evi-
dence in a criminal trial. Specialists must capture and clarify robot 
input data in addition to processing and assessing them for information 
relevant to fact-finding. Where an assessment or other data generated 
by AI is offered as evidence, it acts in some ways as a type of expert wit-
ness. For example, AI-driven systems’ ability to detect patterns in facial 
187. Roth, supra note 3, at 2046. 
188. See Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 129, at 198–212; Roth, supra note 3, at 2050 
(suggesting programmers could give live testimony before a type of scientific commission and 
return to this commission anytime the software is changed or updated). 
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movements is achieved through an ability to decipher patterns from a 
large pool of data that is beyond human comprehension. Such AI ex-
pertise exceeds human capacity, and human experts, even when given 
adequate time to question and evaluate AI, are often unable to explain 
all the details of the operational process and conclusions. This is the 
crux of the problem with machine data and it remains today something 
that must be addressed in a courtroom where humans require some 
type of explanation to help them evaluate the reliability and credibility 
of evidence. 
When vetting human expert testimony, procedural laws generally 
allow for an evaluation of the factors contributing to an expert’s finding 
and how they came to a certain conclusion. The functional equivalent 
of evaluating an expert testifying on behalf of AI-generated informa-
tion is needed but would likely not involve the same explanations as in 
human testimony. Nevertheless, the trier of fact must understand the 
process of how the machine gathers information, evaluates it, and 
makes a determination. Such insight would ideally result from direct 
communication with the AI-driven device or software used but, as 
things stand today, we are limited to explanations by human experts, 
which are hampered by black box problems and the reality that most 
attempts to increase one’s ability to explain AI processes will negatively 
affect the accuracy of the statement.189 The question then becomes, 
what evidentiary safeguards can be put into place to address the poten-
tial risks to trustworthy fact-finding resulting from a human expert pro-
viding testimony for an AI-driven device that can neither speak for itself 
nor explain its assessment? 
a. Germany 
Allowing comprehensive out-of-court testing and the compilation of 
complex test results into a case file shared by all parties offers a useful 
approach for testing machine evidence, particularly where human 
experts are providing evidence about machine data. This format per-
mits the sufficient development and evaluation of the strengths and 
weaknesses of an AI-driven device’s ability to accurately assess human 
conduct. However, an inability to ensure impartiality and accurate self- 
assessment by the bench remains a weakness.190 
Beyond testifying in court, a court-appointed expert can add to the 
trier of fact’s knowledge through an in-depth out-of-court evaluation. 
Such an evaluation is then trusted by the court because the expert has 
189. See Doshi-Velez & Kortz, supra note 60. 
190. See Michael Bohlander, supra note 163, at 154–56, 170–71. 
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“been sworn generally to render opinions of the kind concerned.”191 
The expert’s report can be accepted by the bench as a written expertise 
under one of the exceptions to the principle of immediacy, but 
the expert may also be called into court to orally explain the report and 
be questioned to clarify any areas of doubt. Exceptionally, for instance 
where there is insufficient time to prepare a report in advance, a 
defense expert may come to court without having previously presented 
a written report. 
Forgoing an oral report by an expert carries the inherent risk that im-
portant questions will not be asked. In the case of machine evidence, 
the “communication” with the software or device is entirely mediated 
by the expert without any scrutiny by the parties. Whether, and to what 
extent, a court will summon an expert to verbally explain their methods 
and findings depends on the value the bench places in listening to the 
expert in court (to support fact-finding) and the prosecution’s and 
defense’s opinions of a report.192 The bench takes into account its obli-
gation to seek the truth, based on the right to freely assess available evi-
dence, and the necessity to rationalize and explain how facts were 
established the establishment of facts in a reasoned judgment to avoid 
reversal on appeal. This is especially so where the prosecution or 
defense has pointed out flaws in an expert opinion.193 Where complex 
evidence is at issue, the inquisitorial process of building a case file pro-
vides sufficient opportunity to thoroughly monitor expertise. In the 
case of machine evidence, this would allow for investigation into the 
construction and operation of an AI-driven device, during which time 
parties could point out any potential flaws. This is, of course, depend-
ent upon both sides having adequate resources and access to all the rel-
evant information. 
While fact-finding during the investigation and the preparation of a 
trial is shaped by the prosecution and the court, where the defense 
191. StPO § 256. 
192. In practice, when expert evidence is central to the charges, especially where the mental 
fitness of a defendant is in question, a judge will contact the prosecution and defense before 
appointing an expert to give them an opportunity to comment prior to summoning the expert to 
present her opinion during the oral hearing. See, e.g., Klaus Detter,Der Sachversta¨ndige im 
Strafverfahren - eine Bestandsaufnahme, 18 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FU¨R STRAFRECHT 57, 58 (1998) (Ger.). 
When expert evidence is more of a mechanical assessment, such as reading data from an 
automated vehicle, the prosecution typically contacts the expert during the investigatory stage to 
decide whether charges are to be brought at all and will add a written report to the case file. 
Generally, the choice of expert is accepted by the bench. See BeckOK StGB/Eschelbach [Beck’s 
Online Commentary of German Penal Code] 45 StGB § 20, 100 (C.H. Beck 2020). 
193. Damasˇka, supra note 14, at 425, 454–55. 
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seeks to challenge the court’s acceptance of a written expert opinion it 
has three options. First, a defendant can summon their own expert to 
appear at the oral hearing.194 However, bringing forth and paying for 
one’s own expert is the exception rather than the rule in an inquisito-
rial proceeding. Aside from the practical difficulties,195 the defense 
must overcome the legal provision allowing a bench to refuse to hear 
an expert if, among other reasons,196 it finds that the fact to be proven 
has already been established or it determines that the motion to hear 
the defense’s expert has been made only for the purpose of delaying 
the proceedings.197 
Second, the defense can make a motion to summon new expertise 
during preparation for the main hearing, at which time facts must be 
stated to support taking new evidence. This can be done after the prose-
cution has registered the case file with the court.198 If the prosecution 
has commissioned an expert during the pretrial investigation, this 
expert is to be immediately available for the defense lawyer.199 
The third and most powerful option is for a defendant to request 
that the trial court appoint an additional expert under Section 244.200 
The bench then must summon the expert unless it deems an additional 
expert opinion to be “superfluous because the matter is common 
knowledge, the fact to be proved is irrelevant to the decision or has al-
ready been proved, the evidence is wholly inappropriate or unobtain-
able, the application is made to protract the proceedings, or an 
important allegation which is intended to offer proof in exoneration of 
the defendant may be treated as if the alleged fact were true.”201 The 
court may also reject a motion for additional expert evidence “if 
the court itself possesses the necessary specialized knowledge” or “if the 
194. StPO § 220, para. 1. 
195. A person summoned by the defense must only comply if compensation is deposited with 
the court. Id. § 220, para. 2. Even where compensation is available, a defendant needs skilled 
counsel to question the expert. Notably, where the expert witness summoned by the defendant 
proves to be useful in clarifying the case, the court shall compensate him or her from the state 
treasury. Id. § 220, para. 3. 
196. Judges may not refuse an expert present at trial, summoned by the defendant, simply 
because they find that the testimony was unnecessary (because they are knowledgably themselves) 
or on the grounds that the defendant, not the bench, selected the expert. Obviously, the lines 
between legitimately and improperly refusing a defense expert are fluid, and where the court 
illegitimately refuses to hear such expert opinion, the final judgment may be appealed. 
197. Id. § 245, para. 2. 
198. Id. § 219, para. 1. 
199. Id. § 147, para. 3. 
200. Id. § 244, para. 3. 
201. Id. 
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opposite of the alleged fact has already been proved by the first expert 
opinion.”202 However, the rule does not apply “to cases where the pro-
fessional competence of the first expert is in doubt, where his opinion 
is based upon incorrect factual suppositions, where the opinion con-
tains contradictions, or where the new expert has means of research at 
his disposal which seem to be superior to the ones of an earlier 
expert.”203 
As the defense has access to the entire file it should, at least hypo-
thetically, be aware of whether the expert opinion presented is in com-
pliance with general standards or if new methods are available. 
Notably, the court’s rejection of a motion for additional expert evi-
dence can be appealed.204 However, while there is vast case law address-
ing when the bench may reject such a motion, most do not delve into 
the issue of trustworthiness in fact-finding, which is so commonly ques-
tioned in adversarial proceedings, but instead focus on the issue of the 
bench’s own proficiency in assessing a controversial question without 
the assistance of an expert.205 
Unfortunately, where a bench believes that it is able to answer spe-
cific and complicated scientific questions of machine evidence itself (in 
what is often a less-than-realistic self-assessment), or where it is already 
inclined to believe a particular expert, neither party has a meaningful 
way to challenge such beliefs.206 In those cases, as in others dealing with 
problems around the premature assessment of facts by benches, it may 
be especially difficult to ensure that the court is keeping an open mind 
about new types of evidence.207 
In that respect, the German system has a blind spot in that it does not 
properly weigh the benefits of its nonpartisanship and generous 
amount of time granted to court-appointed experts against the risks of 
a lack of trustworthy fact-finding and open-minded benches. A 2015 
expert law reform commission discusses an argument from judges that, 
202. Id. § 244, para. 4. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. § 337. 
205. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 6, 2011, 2 Strafrecht [StR] 124/ 
11, 2011 (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 9, 2015, 3 Strafrecht 
[StR] 516/14, 2015 (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 12, 2017, 1 
Strafrecht [StR] 408/16, 2017 (Ger.). See Vuille, supra note 100, at 231–32, for further details on 
the expert concept in Continental Europe; see also Jackson & Summers, supra note 94. 
206. Ulrich Eisenberg, BEWEISRECHT DER STPO: SPEZIALKOMMENTAR, 1518 (10th ed. 2017) 
(Ger.). 
207. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 30, 2000, 1 Strafrecht [StR] 
582/99, 2000 (Ger.). 
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in an effort to work efficiently, “[i]n certain areas, the courts are reliant 
on continuous cooperation with experts whose expertise they are con-
vinced of and who, in individual cases, also guarantee them rapid exe-
cution of short-term orders.”208 
The commission also advises judges and prosecutors to consult with the defense before 
selecting an expert. See Bundesministerium der Justiz und fu¨r Verbraucherschutz [Federal 
Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection], Bericht der Expertenkommission zur effektiveren 
und praxistauglicheren Ausgestaltung des allgemeinen Strafverfahrens und des jugend- 
gerichtlichen Verfahrens [Report of the Expert Commission on the Most Effective and 
Practicable Design of the General Criminal Procedure and the Juvenile Court Proceedings] 37 
(2015), https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/PDF/Abschlussbericht_Reform_ 
StPO_Kommission.pdf (Ger.). 
b. United States 
U.S. law offers a highly partisan structure to test expert evidence, 
means for thorough out-of-court testing (albeit underdeveloped), and 
a strong preference for the trier of fact to have unmediated access to 
anyone attempting to convey a specific opinion. Using the example of 
automated driving, this would translate into a desire to make visible any 
use of AI for evidentiary purposes in the courtroom in order to ensure 
trustworthiness in the justice process.209 With respect to the assessment 
of machine evidence, the U.S. system is rather unyielding when it 
comes to out-of-court evidentiary testing, seemingly favoring more 
“direct” communication with AI technology. It also gives credence to 
the fact that despite attempts to improve the trustworthiness of fact- 
finding by providing objective scientific knowledge to the trier of fact, 
experts can be biased. 
Although in the United States both parties select their own experts, 
judges are the gatekeepers of evidence, including expert opinions, by 
ruling on admissibility. The requirement that scientific and expert testi-
mony in federal courts meet the Daubert standard of reliability provides 
the trier of fact with the context necessary to assess a source’s credibil-
ity. For various reasons, including prevailing evidentiary law, judges are 
assigned the task of deciding the methodological issues of scientific evi-
dence as a question of law under the four-tier test established in Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.210 and its progeny.211 Judges must consider a 
208. 
209. See Daniel J. Capra, Expanding (or Just Fixing) the Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1577, 1581–4,1608–9 (2017). 
210. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Bernstein & Jackson, supra 
note 109; see also Mellon, supra note 63, for a detailed discussion. 
211. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 145 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 
U.S. 137, 149 (1999). 
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number of factors in determining the admissibility of scientific and 
expert evidence, including: whether the scientific technique has suc-
cessfully withstood testing; whether it has been subjected to peer review 
and publication; whether it has a known error rate and standards to 
control its operation; and whether it is generally accepted in a scientific 
community.212 
If Daubert were used to determine the admissibility of machine evi-
dence, it would help to exclude the most demonstrably unreliable 
machine evidence. However, the effectiveness of the Daubert test with 
regard to AI-generated data in human-robot interactions remains 
unclear as it is yet to be seen how consumer products that generate 
data will be offered as evidence. The question then becomes, how use-
ful are such hearings beyond the most obvious cases? In all likelihood, 
most judges would admit machine evidence as long as some validation 
studies demonstrate that the machine’s error rate is low and the meth-
odology applied was sound,213 but the existence of such studies remains 
to be seen given that commercial automated systems will almost cer-
tainly not be published and peer reviewed. It is clear that Daubert does 
not apply to machine-generated conclusions, but rather the witness 
statements in which they are included. Because of this, the question is 
really whether or not the Daubert test can and should be modified. 
Where an expert accompanying a machine into a courtroom is a “mere 
scrivener” for the machine’s message,214 the expert must pass the 
Daubert test; where a machine’s assessment is used to prove a fact mate-
rial to the case (like the assessment that a driver has in fact been sleepy) 
it must pass the Daubert test itself. 
Overall, the effect of Daubert on the admissibility of machine evi-
dence as a type of expert statement is unclear. Given that the govern-
ment has the burden of proof in criminal cases, strict gatekeeping will 
directly impact new types of evidence and expertise that they offer. 
Where the defense takes a more active role, the central issue will likely 
become the evidence’s relevance under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 
and 403.215 Indeed, getting the relevant information admitted into 
court and being able to thoroughly evaluate the workings of the AI 
employed are crucial. 
Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the de-
fendant to subpoena evidence and witnesses independently, but still 
212. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. 
213. See Roth, supra note 3, at 1981–82, for further discussion. 
214. Id. at 2032–33. 
215. Myers, supra note 71. 
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must comply with trade secret privileges. This rule could potentially be 
used to bring the defense’s own expert evidence contesting the prose-
cution’s case and also to force the government to give expanded discov-
ery regarding the underlying source code, algorithms, and data for any 
forensic tools used.216 Nevertheless, the judicial role as gatekeepers 
remains vital when the defense is the driving force in presenting 
novel scientific evidence. Courts appear to be reluctant to admit cer-
tain evidence, for instance if they think the defense is inclined to 
distort the science in hopes of creating reasonable doubt among the 
jurors, and rely on Daubert to keep unsound expert evidence out of 
the courtroom.217 So, while in principle the defense has a means of 
calling expert evidence independently from the prosecution,218 
practically speaking, the situation (and the relevant case law) is 
more complicated.219 
With regard to machine evidence generated by consumer products, 
Rule 17 is of special interest as it could be used as a tool to gain access 
to information held by third parties.220 This may often be the case, for 
instance, when an AI-driven device in an automobile generated the 
data in question.221 A Rule 17(c) subpoena is a traditional subpoena 
duces tecum for the production of items at trial. It also permits items to 
be “brought into court in advance . . . so that they may then be 
inspected in advance, for the purpose of course of enabling the party to 
216. Chessman, supra note 5, at 179. 
217. See David E. Bernstein & Eric G. Lasker, Defending Daubert: It’s Time to Amend Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5 (2015); see also Suedabeh Walker, Drawing on Daubert: 
Bringing Reliability to the Forefront in the Admissibility of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 82 EMORY L. 
J. 1205, 1207 (2013). 
218. This is particularly the case when the government omits certain evidence from the 
prosecution but keeps it in a separate “investigatory file,” does not consider potentially 
exonerating evidence, or when the defense wants to reference an item of evidence in the 
possession of a third party. 
219. See United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683 (1974); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987); United States v. Soape, 169 F.3d 
257, 269 (5th Cir. 1999); Miller, supra note 136, at 326. 
220. See, e.g., United States v. Yee, 129 F.R.D. 629 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (finding that laboratory 
matching criteria and standards, environmental insult tests, population data, and proficiency 
testing data held by the FBI are discoverable based on Rule 16(a)(1)(C)). But see United States v. 
Iglesias, 881 F.2d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that log notes produced in the testing 
process are not discoverable as scientific reports). 
221. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(1) (“A subpoena may order the witness to produce any books, 
papers, documents, data, or other objects the subpoena designates. The court may direct the 
witness to produce the designated items in court before trial or before they are to be offered in 
evidence. When the items arrive, the court may permit the parties and their attorneys to inspect 
all or part of them.”). 
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see whether he can use it or whether he wants to use it.”222 According to 
Rule 17 (b), the court must decide whether the public will pay the fee 
for such subpoenas where a defendant can show his or her inability to 
pay. Courts tend to be hesitant to do so where it is suspected that the de-
fendant seeks to interpret the science in such a way that it creates rea-
sonable doubt. The motion is then denied, at least in part, to prevent 
unnecessary public expenses, but also due to a fear of allowing “hocus- 
pocus” into the courtroom.223 
The case law involving the use of digital tools in forensic settings, like 
DNA testing, suggests something akin to the evidentiary life cycle 
described above.224 Today, the trend is toward a stricter standard, and 
the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence has discussed 
the potential addition of Rule 707, which would limit judicial discretion 
in an effort to enhance the reliability of expert evidence.225 
Memorandum from Daniel J. Capra, Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to 
Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert and 
Rule 702 (Oct. 1, 2017), in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF EVIDENCE OCTOBER 2017 AGENDA 
BOOK 371, 381 (2017) (alterations in original) (proposing a new Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 
707), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/a3_0.pdf (“If a witness is testifying on the basis 
of a forensic examination [conducted to determine whether an evidentiary sample is similar or 
identical to a source sample], [or: “testifying to a forensic identification”] the proponent must 
prove the following in addition to satisfying the requirements of Rule 702: (a) the witness’s 
method is repeatable, reproducible, and accurate — as shown by empirical studies conducted 
under conditions appropriate to its intended use; (b) the witness is capable of applying the 
method reliably. . . and actually did so; and (c) the witness accurately states. . . the probative value 
of [the meaning of] any similarity or match between the evidentiary sample and the source 
sample.”); see also Saltzburg, supra note 149, at 1709. 
It would 
also provide greater inclusion of out-of-court statements from which 
courts expect the trier of fact to gain a better understanding of a com-
plex evidentiary issue. 
6. New Mechanisms of Contextualization and Credibility Testing 
There is a need for new mechanisms to not only contextualize and 
test the credibility of machine evidence, but also to enable the trier of 
fact to assess the reliability of machine evidence. In the United States, 
this could be achieved by a partial separation of credibility testing from 
the prevailing courtroom-centered hearsay model, thereby initiating a 
new approach to confrontation rights in the digital age, including the 
right to evaluate AI-driven devices out of court.226 By contrast, in 
222. Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 222 n.5 (1951). 
223. See Saltzburg, supra note 149, at 1720. 
224. See supra Part III.B.3. 
225. 
226. Roth, supra note 3, at 2048. 
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Germany, new tools must be provided to the defense to allow a bench’s 
fact-finding and expert evidence to be meaningfully challenged; it is 
particularly important that the defense is granted access to any data 
that is at the disposal of the court-appointed expert. 
A comparative analysis of the inquisitorial and adversarial criminal 
justice systems revealed that there are new evidentiary problems should 
machine evidence enter the courtroom and that there may not be one 
single solution. An increase in human-robot interaction will unlock the 
potential to access large quantities of information provided we are will-
ing to overlook the significant questions around its reliability and our 
limited means of adequately evaluating such information. Additionally, 
the use of such data raises further concerns regarding trade secrecy 
and privacy, but these issues are beyond the scope of this Article.227 
Nevertheless, the contrasting analysis provides valuable information 
about the distinct nature of machine evidence and a clearer picture of 
the evidentiary problems AI may cause in courtrooms across jurisdic-
tions. Traditionally, both the inquisitorial and adversarial systems have 
addressed difficulties in maintaining trustworthy fact-finding by point-
ing out human errors in the evidentiary procedure. Both systems will 
have to modify their approach if they seek to introduce machine evi-
dence into criminal proceedings. In some ways, the conclusion is the 
same in both jurisdictions: AI’s unique status must be acknowledged 
and the message it conveys needs to be made visible to the parties, the 
court, and the public. 
How AI is best made visible in the courtroom is strongly linked to the 
nuances of each criminal justice system. In the United States, a system 
proffered by Andrea Roth228 proposes pre-trial credibility testing of the 
front-end design, input, and operation protocols of machine evidence. 
Such meaningful access to the device in question before trial could 
allow for a partisan review of the machine’s functioning. Eventually, 
valid contextualization and credibility testing will depend on the 
machine or software’s design and construction. Beyond domestic singu-
larities and varying technology, a normative approach to ensure reli-
able fact-finding still must be determined. In doing so, the two systems 
can increase trustworthiness in fact-finding when machine evidence is 
at issue by departing from prevailing methods of credibility testing.   
227. See Nawara, supra note 105, at 614 (for issues around trade secrets); see also Wexler, supra 
note 78; Ram, supra note 78, at 665–683, 701–03. 
228. Roth, supra note 3, at 2028. 
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
248 [Vol. 51 
In an adversarial system, this would mean changes to the courtroom- 
centered model of testimony.229 To ensure the credibility of an intelli-
gent machine and the reliability of its evidence, the complexity of the 
underlying technology might be better scrutinized outside the court-
room independent from a case.230 Experts evaluating the machine’s 
design, learning pattern, source code, and other programming might 
be better able to make an initial decision about its reliability and credi-
bility outside the courtroom, which could act as an individual assess-
ment of evidence offered in a case.231 These types of evidentiary proxies 
could be accepted as necessary contributions to an evaluation of trust-
worthiness under the circumstances.232 
In an inquisitorial system, features within the fact-finding procedure 
that result in unyielding trust in traditional defense tools, which are 
based upon the presumption that a bench is able to maintain an open 
mind throughout the proceeding, must be addressed. This could be 
accomplished by granting a right (where necessary) to challenge both 
judges and experts that goes beyond the current framework of simply 
allowing a defendant to prepare his or her defense using the reports in 
the case file. This is because the available evidentiary tools today may 
fail to address the crucial issues around the reliability of machine evi-
dence.233 With regard to machine evidence, the approach would need 
to shift from one that is bench-dominated toward one that is more ex-
amination-oriented whereby all incriminating witnesses are evaluated 
pursuant to Article 6 of the ECHR.234 This move toward a more adversa-
rial method of dealing with machine evidence has been adopted by a 
majority of the Higher Regional Courts in Germany and shows promise 
as a means of vetting digital evidentiary tools.235 
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234. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Where machine evidence is proffered as evidence in a criminal trial, 
it must be adequately contextualized and tested for reliability. Such evi-
dence—just like human testimony—is not infallible.236 Especially where 
the digital output of an opaque device, initially produced as technology 
for a consumer need, is accepted as a conduit of fact or circumstantial 
evidence, legislatures and courts must address this issue both open- 
mindedly and critically.237 
With the rise of AI in all areas of human life, it seems especially im-
portant that legal scholarship point out that our presumptions of regu-
larity and impartiality in machine workings are often inaccurate.238 
Many factors have to be taken into account. Research conducted across 
a variety of fields has demonstrated that the physical shape and cogni-
tive capacity of an AI-driven device directly affects our perception of its 
reliability, soundness, and overall “character.”239 We seldom realize this 
fact and even more rarely question what features of any device should 
trigger confidence or doubt in the reliability of is findings.240 
From a legal perspective, the use of AI-generated evidence in crimi-
nal proceedings remains an enigma. Laws do not provide rules around 
scrutinizing “intelligent machines” for credibility and, as long as 
236. See Roth, supra note 30, at 1283–85, 1300–01; Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine & 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 825–26 (2010); Ellen M. Ayoob, 
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1840–44 (2003). 
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Acquisti, Sean W. Smith & Ahmad-Reza Sadehi eds., 2010) (identifying and critiquing several 
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machines and software lack the necessary characteristics to be meaning-
fully cross-examined about their conclusions, the law will continue to 
treat them as if they do not convey a message of their own and are noth-
ing more than number-crunching tools. Such a cursory approach has 
been criticized as falling short in exposing all the potential risks to reli-
able fact-finding in criminal proceedings.241 
A comparative perspective helps to better understand how the issue 
of machine evidence could potentially be resolved. The adversarial sys-
tem has created tools to scrutinize evidence for reliability, while the 
inquisitorial system has developed a model of successive out-of-court 
evidence gathering that allows for all parties to meaningfully evaluate 
complex evidence. 
The basic problem of machine evidence is the same for all jurisdic-
tions. How can data generated by AI be adequately inspected given the 
fact that it cannot be vetted like human witnesses, yet still might con-
tribute human-like biases through the way it processes data and assesses 
situations? How do we utilize such data knowing that machines and soft-
ware, while not visible in a courtroom, are potentially active players in 
the events leading to a prosecution? 
How to approach a new issue, like the use of machine evidence in 
criminal proceedings, is a dilemma well-known to other areas of the 
law. 242 Do we begin from a technical or legal standpoint, i.e., code for 
the law or law for the code?243 The decision at this stage will not only 
determine whether adversarial and inquisitorial systems face similar or 
different problems going forward, but also whether or not fact-finding 
will remain the familiar human-centered procedure we know, which is 
focused on providing transparent and (ideally) objective information 
to the trier of fact to aid in decision-making. 
Artificial Intelligence designed to interact with humans to meet a 
consumer need comes with embedded values.244 In general, its forma-
tion does not align with the relevant legal norms on evidence law, and 
certainly does not comport to the typical fact-finding procedure or con-
stitutional guarantees of a criminal trial. To believe that human parties 
to a criminal trial will be willing and able to decode the digital 
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infrastructure in pursuit of the truth without having access to new evi-
dentiary tools is naı¨ve. 
Therefore, now is the time to prepare for fact-finding in ambient 
intelligent environments. To do so, we first must understand the char-
acteristics of the various types of machine evidence and work with quali-
fied experts to both understand the technology and explain the 
underlying legal concepts.245 Only then can AI-driven devices be mean-
ingfully evaluated in the courtroom from all necessary angles. If one 
addresses the problem of integrating machine evidence into the estab-
lishment of facts in criminal trials, from a technical standpoint (thereby 
requiring technology to serve the law), the adversarial and the inquisi-
torial systems would face the same, albeit monumental, challenges. 
Both could theoretically take similar action, like certifying AI-driven 
devices, providing open access to source code, and specifying machine 
learning parameters. If new legal solutions were to be pursued, each sys-
tem would need to find its own answer, but could still learn from the 
other. It is likely that machine evidence will follow the life cycle of tech-
nological evidence: Initially deemed too new to be reliable; then new 
but subject to testing and as a result, regarded as generally reliable; and 
finally, it may reach the point of being blindly trusted. A look back into 
the recent past of criminal justice teaches us that reversing the evidenti-
ary cycle is an uphill battle and one that is preceded by a great deal of 
human suffering because of judicial errors. It will be important to 
understand how procedural safeguards apply to AI in the courtroom. 
Regardless of whether AI becomes a new tool to convict246 or 
acquit,247 we must ensure trustworthiness in the fact-finding process 
where machine evidence is used in criminal proceedings. In general, 
humans trust each other’s testimony despite a great deal of evidence 
questioning its reliability. Assumedly, we find it convincing because we 
can relate to human perception and experience; in a word, we possess 
empathy. Machine evidence could attempt to create a similar impres-
sion and perhaps what they lack in human characteristics they make up 
for with purported objectivity. It is not entirely clear why we humans 
are wired to believe the statements of our fellow human beings. 
Perhaps it is because we trust in the inherent goodness of people or we 
assume that the fear of punishment for perjury will prevent them from 
245. See Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 129, at 185. 
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lying. However, AI, as we know it today, is subject to none of these 
constraints. 
These are issues which must be urgently addressed if the law is to 
keep up with the rapid pace of advancing technology and are best 
solved through mutual learning between adversarial and inquisitorial 
justice systems. No evidentiary system is perfect, but the U.S. system 
prides itself on its strength, flexibility, and willingness to experiment 
with new approaches.248 This is the opportunity to showcase such vir-
tues. The trier of fact ought not to be faced with a new reality that limits 
reliability and credibility testing just because a new and unfamiliar type 
of evidence is built upon a particular design that cannot be meaning-
fully challenged in today’s courtrooms. In order to preserve the authen-
ticity and legitimacy of fact-finding in a criminal trial, it must remain 
human-centered.  
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